Are self-evaluations helpful or harmful when employees are unaware of their marginal contribution to firm welfare?
| dc.contributor.advisor | Kachelmeier, Steven J. (Steven John), 1958- | en |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Williamson, Michael G. | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Anderson, Urton L. | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Dukerich, Janet M. | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Koonce, Lisa L. | en |
| dc.creator | Reichert, Bernhard Erich | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-26T21:28:58Z | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-26T21:29:24Z | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-05-11T22:20:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-10-26T21:28:58Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2010-10-26T21:29:24Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2017-05-11T22:20:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-08 | en |
| dc.date.submitted | August 2010 | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2010-10-26T21:29:24Z | en |
| dc.description | text | en |
| dc.description.abstract | This study examines whether eliciting self-evaluations increases or decreases the propensity of a productive agent to retaliate against an employer for paying compensation that the agent perceives to be too low for the work performed. Specifically, I consider a setting in which a principal knows more about the agent’s production than even the agent can observe. In such a setting, an agent might perceive that s/he is being underpaid if the principal pays less than the agent believes s/he deserves, especially if the agent is overconfident about his/her own productive ability. Such an agent could take retaliatory actions against the principal that would be costly to both parties. Self-evaluations could mitigate such tendencies if they result in compensation that is more aligned with agent self-perceptions. Alternatively, self-evaluations could worsen such tendencies if they reinforce the perceived inequity of compensation that does not match agent self-perceptions. I present experimental evidence from comparing a control condition without self-evaluations to three different forms of self-evaluation reports, finding evidence consistent with the premise that self-evaluations increase retaliatory actions and lower welfare. My findings show a cost to self-evaluations that thus far has not been sufficiently considered in the literature. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-08-1624 | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.subject | Managerial accounting | en |
| dc.subject | Self-evaluations | en |
| dc.subject | Subjective performance measures | en |
| dc.subject | Management | en |
| dc.subject | Salary | en |
| dc.subject | Job performance | en |
| dc.title | Are self-evaluations helpful or harmful when employees are unaware of their marginal contribution to firm welfare? | en |
| dc.type.genre | thesis | en |