Designing incentives in P2P systems.

dc.contributor.advisorDonahoo, Michael J.
dc.contributor.authorBerciu, Radu Mihai.
dc.contributor.departmentComputer Science.en_US
dc.contributor.schoolsBaylor University. Dept. of Computer Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-24T14:06:29Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-07T19:34:55Z
dc.date.available2013-09-24T14:06:29Z
dc.date.available2017-04-07T19:34:55Z
dc.date.copyright2013-08
dc.date.issued2013-09-24
dc.description.abstractThe goal of this thesis is bringing closer together the game theoretic approach of creating incentives with the requirements and properties of P2P systems. Briefly, we detail the P2P system context that incentive mechanisms must address, focusing on the main properties (e.g., the existence of cheap identities), types of transacted goods, common goals (e.g., maximize utilization, robustness to rational manipulations) and common problems (e.g., easy-riding) of such systems; we define the design space for P2P incentive mechanisms through the first taxonomy for such mechanisms and examine the main classes; we analyze in-depth how known incentive mechanisms achieve their goals, from both a P2P systems and a game theory perspectives using BitTorrent and mechanism design models; we bundle our prescriptions into a framework for designing P2P incentive mechanisms, and we use it to create an incentive mechanism for a BitTorrent-like system.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/8811
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisheren
dc.rightsBaylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.subjectPeer-to-peer architecture (Computer networks)en_US
dc.subjectGame theory -- computer programs.en_US
dc.titleDesigning incentives in P2P systems.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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