The role of the Supreme Court in antitrust enforcement.

dc.contributor.advisorNichols, David K.
dc.contributor.authorRamsey, David P., 1979-
dc.contributor.departmentPolitical Science.en
dc.contributor.otherBaylor University. Dept. of Political Science.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-23T12:29:19Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-07T19:33:48Z
dc.date.available2010-06-23T12:29:19Z
dc.date.available2017-04-07T19:33:48Z
dc.date.copyright2010-05
dc.date.issued2010-06-23T12:29:19Z
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. ).en
dc.description.abstractFor more than one hundred years, American antitrust laws have helped to define the legal framework supporting the continuously expanding and developing American economy. This legal framework has not remained unchanged; rather, the antitrust laws have been revised and re-interpreted at fairly regular intervals, leading to periodic changes in the scope and conduct of antitrust enforcement. Interest in and support for the antitrust enterprise may be seen to rise and fall in rough correlation with changes in the political and economic cycles. Prominent accounts of the development of American antitrust enforcement have tended to emphasize the importance of Congress, the President, the agencies, and, most recently, economic theorists, in helping to shape and re-define antitrust policy. My dissertation contributes to this literature by focusing on the institutional role played by the Supreme Court in balancing the contentions of the political branches, the enforcement agencies, and the advocates of various schools of economic thought, while also working internally to develop those rules of statutory construction and interpretation and those trial procedures best suited to the peculiar nature of antitrust proceedings. I examine several distinct approaches on the Court to antitrust enforcement—the common law, the rule of reason, monopolistic competition, workable competition, and per se regimentation—before turning to the development of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, first examining its origins in the law and economics seminars of Aaron Director, then following its expansion through the scholarship of Director's students and colleagues, and finally tracing some of the most important instances of the Supreme Court's confrontation with Chicago School doctrine. Following a brief look to the future of antitrust law, I conclude with some reflections on both the enduring relevance of the rule of reason in the Court's antitrust jurisprudence and the Court's unique institutional strengths as a systemic regulator of the American economy.en
dc.description.degreePh.D.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby David P. Ramsey.en
dc.format.extent1208843 bytes
dc.format.extent985963 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/7960
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.rightsBaylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide access.en
dc.rights.accessrightsAccess changed 3/18/13.
dc.subjectSupreme Court.en
dc.subjectAntitrust law.en
dc.subjectPublic law.en
dc.subjectAmerican political development.en
dc.subjectJudicial politics.en
dc.subjectConstitutional history.en
dc.subjectJurisprudence.en
dc.subjectLaw and economics.en
dc.subjectConstitutional law.en
dc.subjectSherman Act.en
dc.subjectClayton Act.en
dc.titleThe role of the Supreme Court in antitrust enforcement.en
dc.typeThesisen

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