Power in text : extracting institutional relationships from natural language

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dc.contributor.advisorJessee, Stephen A., 1980-
dc.creatorShaffer, Robert Bradley
dc.creator.orcid0000-0002-3055-3584
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-06T16:25:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-22T22:31:35Z
dc.date.available2017-02-06T16:25:28Z
dc.date.available2018-01-22T22:31:35Z
dc.date.issued2016-12
dc.date.submittedDecember 2016
dc.date.updated2017-02-06T16:25:28Z
dc.description.abstractHow do legislators allocate policy-making authority? Generally speaking, institutional design decisions involve a trade-off between efficiency and accountability, as legislators seek to simultaneously maximize bureaucratic effectiveness and ensure favorable policy outcomes. At least in the legal context, these design decisions are often articulated in textual documents (e.g. statutes and constitutions). Unfortunately, existing measurement schemes cannot capture the full range of institutional design technologies available to legislative actors. These limitations have prevented scholars from addressing important questions regarding the relationship between executive/legislative preference conflicts, background institutional context, and downstream design of legislation. In this paper, I develop a text-based measurement scheme intended to address these limitations, which I apply to an original dataset of American legislative texts.
dc.description.departmentStatistics
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T2WW7747T
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/45560
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectText analysis
dc.subjectLegislative studies
dc.titlePower in text : extracting institutional relationships from natural language
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext

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