Kant's response to the problem of induction

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dc.contributor.committeeChairDiPoppa, Francesca
dc.contributor.committeeChairKim, Sungsu
dc.creatorSharp, Curtis T.
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-14T23:14:39Z
dc.date.available2012-06-01T16:33:58Z
dc.date.available2016-11-14T23:14:39Z
dc.date.issued2008-08
dc.degree.departmentPhilosophy
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I examine Immanuel Kant’s response to David Hume’s problem of induction. I pay particular attention to Kant’s main writings on causation: the Second Analogy in The Critique of Pure Reason and the Introduction to The Critique of Judgment. I agree with Paul Guyer that Kant does not provide a solution to the problem in the Critique of Reason. I disagree with Guyer, however, that Kant also does not provide a solution in the Critique of Judgment: whereas Guyer concludes that Kant tells us that we merely assume – and cannot prove - that induction is justified, I conclude that Kant argues for an externalist justification of induction.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2346/8555
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.availabilityUnrestricted.
dc.subjectCausation
dc.subjectGuyer
dc.subjectProblem of induction
dc.subjectHume
dc.subjectKant
dc.titleKant's response to the problem of induction
dc.typeThesis

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