The indispensability of empathy : the role of empathy in making moral judgments

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dc.contributor.advisorDeigh, John
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHiggins, Kathleen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMontague, Michelle
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDancy, Jonathan
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWoodruff, Paul
dc.contributor.committeeMemberJacobson, Daniel
dc.creatorVanderhoek, Jonathan
dc.creator.orcid0000-0002-5742-3974
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-21T17:04:21Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-22T22:30:51Z
dc.date.available2016-10-21T17:04:21Z
dc.date.available2018-01-22T22:30:51Z
dc.date.issued2016-08
dc.date.submittedAugust 2016
dc.date.updated2016-10-21T17:04:21Z
dc.description.abstractDo we need empathy as moral agents? Some philosophers think not. Some also deny that we benefit from empathy, and some go as far as to argue that empathy impairs our ability to make sound moral judgments. These doubts about empathy call into question its place in moral life. The aim of my dissertation is to remove these doubts by showing that empathy is indispensible to moral agents. Empathy helps us to appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings such that we are in a better position to make, correct, and recognize moral judgments. Empathy, however, is not just a helpful resource; it is not something optional that agents can choose to disregard. Instead, for those who can take advantage of it, empathy is required as a resource that enables more sophisticated participation in the moral community.
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T2RX93F8J
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/41775
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectEmpathy
dc.subjectMoral judgment
dc.subjectMoral psychology
dc.subjectReactive attitudes
dc.subjectPerspective-taking
dc.titleThe indispensability of empathy : the role of empathy in making moral judgments
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext

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