Three essays on industrial organization

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dc.contributor.advisorSibley, David S.en
dc.creatorTran, Du Vinhen
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-28T23:24:41Zen
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-11T22:17:41Z
dc.date.available2008-08-28T23:24:41Zen
dc.date.available2017-05-11T22:17:41Z
dc.date.issued2007en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractThis thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 explores the impact of compatibility regulation on the technological transition in industries with indirect network externalities. This chapter contrasts the scenario where firms make their own compatibility decisions with the scenario where compatibility is mandatory and shows that firms are better off in the first scenario and worse off in the second scenario. In some cases, technological transition takes place if there is no regulation, but may not take place if the compatibility regulation is in place. Beside regulation, the technological transition in these industries may be held back by either the coordination problem or the compensation problem. The analysis culminates by showing conditions in which these problems can be eliminated. Chapter 2 explores the coderelease decision of profit-maximizing software firms. Equilibrium results show that firms will not release code if the complementarity coefficient is either too low or too high. If the open source community can produce high quality open source software, then both firms may adopt the open source approach. If the open source community is moderately efficient and the complementarity coefficient falls in a middle range, then the decision to adopt open source approach depends on the efficiency gap between the two firms. Chapter 3 explores the impact of keyword auction on online retailers’ pricing strategies. The incumbent has positioning advantage on the search engine but the new entrant can bid for the sponsored advertisement place and neutralize such advantage. In equilibrium, preemptive advertisement exists. In one scenario, there is a pure equilibrium in which the incumbent charges a higher price and outbids the entrant in the sponsored ads auction. In the other scenario, there is a unique mixed equilibrium in which the incumbent can only partially deter the entrant from moving up.
dc.description.departmentEconomicsen
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.identifierb68669574en
dc.identifier.oclc166409876en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/3055en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en
dc.subject.lcshElectromagnetic compatibility--Economic aspects--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshElectromagnetic compatibility--Law and legislation--Economic aspects--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshHigh definition television--Receivers and reception--Economic aspects--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshTelevision supplies industry--Managementen
dc.subject.lcshOpen source software--Economic aspects--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshComputer software industry--Managementen
dc.subject.lcshInternet auctions--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshEquilibrium (Economics)en
dc.titleThree essays on industrial organizationen
dc.type.genreThesisen

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