Non-propositional objects of the attitudes
| dc.contributor.advisor | Sainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark) | |
| dc.creator | Grzankowski, Alex Paul | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-30T18:03:30Z | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-05-11T22:34:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-05-11T22:34:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-05 | en |
| dc.date.submitted | May 2013 | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2013-09-30T18:03:31Z | en |
| dc.description | text | en |
| dc.description.abstract | I argue that there are irreducibly non-propositional intentional states, mental states that are about things (states such as fearing snakes, liking ice-cream, and so on) but which do not have a propositional content. I provide a positive account of such states and offer philosophical insights concerning concepts and content that emerge once they are recognized. | en |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/21381 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.subject | Propositional attitudes | en |
| dc.subject | Intentionality | en |
| dc.title | Non-propositional objects of the attitudes | en |