Epistemic blame : its nature and its norms.

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dc.contributor.advisorDougherty, Trent.
dc.creatorBryant, James Clifton.
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-01T14:12:24Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-07T19:35:32Z
dc.date.available2016-09-01T14:12:24Z
dc.date.available2017-04-07T19:35:32Z
dc.date.created2016-08
dc.date.issued2016-07-29
dc.date.submittedAugust 2016
dc.date.updated2016-09-01T14:12:25Z
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation, I investigate our practices of blaming others for failing to believe as they ought to believe. I begin by articulating an account of blame in general, and extend that account to specifically epistemic blame. After considering the relationship between epistemic blame and moral blame, I argue that it is very difficult for us to know whether others are epistemically blameworthy. I conclude by arguing that we have good reasons to expect genuine epistemic blameworthiness to be quite rare, and that this fact justifies a charitable reluctance to blame others epistemically.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/9833
dc.language.isoen
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide access.
dc.subjectEpistemic normativity. Blame.
dc.titleEpistemic blame : its nature and its norms.
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext

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