Reduction, ontology and the limits of convention

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dc.contributor.advisorSainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark)en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDever, Joshuaen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberKoons, Roberten
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHochberg, Herberten
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMacBride, Fraseren
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBonevac, Danielen
dc.creatorPickel, Bryan Williamen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-13T18:02:27Zen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-13T18:02:41Zen
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-11T22:22:15Z
dc.date.available2011-06-13T18:02:27Zen
dc.date.available2011-06-13T18:02:41Zen
dc.date.available2017-05-11T22:22:15Z
dc.date.issued2010-12en
dc.date.submittedDecember 2010en
dc.date.updated2011-06-13T18:02:41Zen
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractIt is widely agreed that ontological reduction is possible, that the ontology of one theory can be shown to be nothing over and above the ontology of a distinct theory. However, it is also widely agreed that one assesses a theory’s ontology by determining what it says there is. I show that there is a tension between these orthodox positions. To resolve this tension, I propose and defend the view that the ontological commitments of a statement are sensitive to the theory in which it is embedded.en
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-12-2367en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen
dc.subjectOntologyen
dc.subjectOntological commitmenten
dc.subjectReductionismen
dc.subjectMeta-ontologyen
dc.titleReduction, ontology and the limits of conventionen
dc.type.genrethesisen

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