Epistemicism

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dc.contributor.advisorSainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark)en
dc.contributor.advisorKamp, Hansen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBonevac, Daniel A.en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberKoons, Robert C.en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDever, Joshuaen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberRaffman, Dianaen
dc.creatorHu, Ivan J.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-08T16:11:18Zen
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-22T22:28:03Z
dc.date.available2018-01-22T22:28:03Z
dc.date.issued2015-05en
dc.date.submittedMay 2015en
dc.date.updated2015-09-08T16:11:18Zen
dc.description.abstractI propose a new theory of vagueness centered around the epistemology and normativity of vagueness. The theory is a version of epistemicism—the view that vagueness is a fundamentally epistemic phenomenon—that improves upon existing epistemicist accounts by accommodating both the alleged tolerance and open texture of vague predicates, while foregoing excessive metaphysical commitments. I offer a novel solution to the infamous Sorites paradox, one that outrivals alternative contextualist theories in their ability to explain the phenomenology of vagueness as well as its deontic consequences.en
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/30994en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectVaguenessen
dc.subjectEpistemologyen
dc.subjectLogicen
dc.titleEpistemicismen
dc.typeThesisen

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