Explaining resilience in clientelist voting

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dc.contributor.advisorLuskin, Robert C.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberElkins, Zachary
dc.contributor.committeeMemberTurgeon, Mathieu
dc.contributor.committeeMemberFindley, Michael
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWilson, Robert H
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDietz, Henry
dc.creatorLloyd, Ryan Samuel
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-17T22:06:20Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-22T22:31:39Z
dc.date.available2017-02-17T22:06:20Z
dc.date.available2018-01-22T22:31:39Z
dc.date.issued2016-12
dc.date.submittedDecember 2016
dc.date.updated2017-02-17T22:06:21Z
dc.description.abstractThe central argument of this dissertation is relatively counterintuitive: increases in income do not necessarily cause decreases in clientelist voting. A decline in clientelist voting—voting based on individualized, voluntary, and asymmetric transactions with politicians—requires the presence of another factor: a viable alternative to clientelist politicians. This, in turn, hinges upon institutional factors, particularly the effective number of parties of a given country. In countries with many different parties and candidates, increases in income will not affect levels of clientelist voting. I draw on a variety of data to support my claim, including non-participant observation and interviews from the 2014 electoral campaign in Brazil, as well as Brazilian survey data, cross-national expert surveys on clientelism, and natural experiments using experimental trials of income transfer programs to pinpoint the effect of income on clientelist voting.
dc.description.departmentGovernment
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T2PG1HT1X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/45710
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectClientelism
dc.subjectPolitical behavior
dc.subjectBrazil
dc.subjectVote buying
dc.subjectNatural experiment
dc.subjectMixed methods
dc.titleExplaining resilience in clientelist voting
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext

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