Taking a break from constitutional authority? : toward a relational understanding of recess appointments

dc.contributor.advisorTulis, Jeffreyen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberJacobsohn, Gary Jen
dc.creatorBell, Thomas Rivesen
dc.creator.orcid0000-0003-2740-1018en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-09T21:34:12Zen
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-22T22:29:00Z
dc.date.available2015-11-09T21:34:12Zen
dc.date.available2018-01-22T22:29:00Z
dc.date.issued2015-05en
dc.date.submittedMay 2015en
dc.date.updated2015-11-09T21:34:12Zen
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractThis paper re-contextualize legal debates about recess appointments by considering how a relational approach might provide a better way to resolve these controversies. According to this relational reconceptualization, legalist, or constitutionally settled, understandings of recess appointments might entrench certain constitutional pathologies -- namely, partisan-motivated Congressional intransigence, or unencumbered presidential circumvention of Congress -- while offering little recourse to the branch that loses the legal argument. Through this re-contextualization the paper considers how constitutional authority can be developed as the branches engage each other responsively at the level of constitutional politics. To do this, the paper examines the institutional tools and capacities each branch has at its disposal to engage the other. Then, moving from phenomenon to theory, the paper presents a set of criteria by which political actors and citizens can evaluate recess appointments and congressional responses to them.en
dc.description.departmentGovernmenten
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T2WD1Nen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/32349en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRecess appointmentsen
dc.subjectSeparation of powersen
dc.subjectRelational modelen
dc.titleTaking a break from constitutional authority? : toward a relational understanding of recess appointmentsen
dc.typeThesisen

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