Browsing by Subject "process monitoring"
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Item Development of a Real-Time Detection Strategy for Material Accountancy and Process Monitoring During Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Using the Urex+3A Method(2010-07-14) Goddard, BradenReprocessing nuclear fuel is becoming more viable in the United States due to the anticipated increase in construction of nuclear power plants, the growing stockpile of existing used nuclear fuel, and a public desire to reduce the amount of this fuel. However, a new reprocessing facility in non-weapon states must be safeguarded and new reprocessing facilities in weapon states will likely have safeguards due to political and material accountancy reasons. These facilities will have state of the art controls and monitoring methods to safeguard special nuclear materials, as well as to provide real-time monitoring. The focus of this project is to enable the development of a safeguards strategy that uses well established photon measurement methods to characterize samples from the UREX+3a reprocessing method using a variety of detector types and measurement times. It was determined that the errors from quantitative measurements were too large for traditional safeguards methods; however, a safeguards strategy based on qualitative gamma ray and neutron measurements is proposed. The gamma ray detection equipment used in the safeguard strategy could also be used to improve the real-time process monitoring in a yet-to-be built facility. A facility that had real-time gamma detection equipment could improve product quality control and provide additional benefits, such as waste volume reduction. In addition to the spectral analyses, it was determined by Monte Carlo N Particle (MCNP) simulations that there is no noticeable self shielding for internal pipe diameters less than 2 inches, indicating that no self shielding correction factors are needed. Further, it was determined that HPGe N-type detectors would be suitable for a neutron radiation environment. Finally, the gamma ray spectra for the measured samples were simulated using MCNP and then the model was extended to predict the responses from an actual reprocessing scenario from UREX+3a applied to fuel that had a decay time of three years. The 3-year decayed fuel was more representative of commercially reprocessed fuel than the acquired UREX+3a samples. This research found that the safeguards approach proposed in this paper would be best suited as an addition to existing safeguard strategies. Real-time gamma ray detection for process monitoring would be beneficial to a reprocessing facility and could be done with commercially available detectors.Item Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process(2011-08-08) Feener, Jessica S.As nuclear energy grows in the United States and around the world, the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle is inevitable. All currently deployed commercial reprocessing plants are based on the Plutonium - Uranium Extraction (PUREX) process. However, this process is not implemented in the U.S. for a variety of reasons, one being that it is considered by some as a proliferation risk. The 2001 Nuclear Energy Policy report recommended that the U.S. "develop reprocessing and treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant." The Uranium Extraction (UREX+) reprocessing technique has been developed to reach these goals. However, in order for UREX+ to be considered for commercial implementation, a safeguards approach is needed to show that a commercially sized UREX+ facility can be safeguarded to current international standards. A detailed safeguards approach for a UREX+1a reprocessing facility has been developed. The approach includes the use of nuclear material accountancy (MA), containment and surveillance (C/S) and solution monitoring (SM). Facility information was developed for a hypothesized UREX+1a plant with a throughput of 1000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) per year. Safeguard goals and safeguard measures to be implemented were established. Diversion and acquisition pathways were considered; however, the analysis focuses mainly on diversion paths. The detection systems used in the design have the ability to provide near real-time measurement of special fissionable material in feed, process and product streams. Advanced front-end techniques for the quantification of fissile material in spent nuclear fuel were also considered. The economic and operator costs of these systems were not considered. The analysis shows that the implementation of these techniques result in significant improvements in the ability of the safeguards system to achieve the objective of timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from the UREX+1a reprocessing facility and to provide deterrence against such diversion by early detection.