Browsing by Subject "private information"
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Item Coordination of supply chain inventory systems with private information(Texas A&M University, 2007-04-25) Chu, Chi-LeungThis dissertation considers the problems of coordinating different supply chain inventory systems with private information under deterministic settings. These systems studied are characterized by the following properties: (a) each facility in the system has self decision-making authority, (b) cost parameters of each facility are regarded as private information that no other facilities in the system have access to, and (c) partial information is shared among the facilities. Because of the above properties, the existing approaches for systems with global information may not be applicable. Thus, new approaches for coordinating supply chain inventory systems with private information are needed. This dissertation first studies two two-echelon distribution inventory systems. Heuristics for finding the replenishment policy of each facility are developed under global information environment. In turn, the heuristics are modified to solve the problems with private information. An important characteristic of the heuristics developed for the private information environment is that they provide the same solutions as their global information counterpart. Then, more complex multi-echelon serial and assembly supply chain inventory systems with private information are studied. The solution approach decomposes the problem into separate subproblems such that the private information is divided as required. Global optimality is sought with an iterative procedure in which the subproblems negotiate the material flows between facilities. At the core of the solution procedure is a node-model that represents a facility and its corresponding private information. Using the node-model as a building block, other supply chains can be formed by linking the node-models according to the product and information flows. By computational experiments, the effect of the private information on the performance of the supply chain is tested by comparing the proposed approach against existing heuristics that utilize global information. Experimental results show that the proposed approach provides comparable results as those of the existing heuristics with global information.Item Dispersion in analysts' forecasts: does it make a difference?(Texas A&M University, 2004-09-30) Adut, DavitFinancial analysts are an important group of information intermediaries in the capital markets. Their reports, including both earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, are widely transmitted and have a significant impact on stock prices (Womack 1996; Lys and Sohn 1990, among others). Empirical accounting research frequently relies on analysts' forecasts to construct proxies for variables of interest. For example, the error in mean forecast is used as a proxy for earnings surprise (e.g., Brown et al.1987; Wiedman 1996; Bamber et al.1997). More recent papers provide evidence that the mean consensus forecast is used as a benchmark for evaluating firm performance. (Degeorge et al. 1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Another stream of research uses the forecast dispersion as a proxy for the uncertainty or the degree of consensus among analysts and focuses on the information properties of analysts (e.g., Daley et al. 1988; Ziebart 1990; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barron and Stuerke 1998; Barron et al. 1998). In this paper I combine the two streams of research, and investigate how lack of consensus changes the information environment of analysts and whether the markets perceive this change. More specifically, I investigate the amount of private information in a divergent earnings estimate (i.e. one that is above or below the consensus), whether the markets react to it at either the time of the forecast release, at the realization of actual earnings, and whether Regulation Fair Disclosure has changed the information environment differently for high and low dispersion firms.Item Theories on Auctions with Participation Costs(2010-01-14) Cao, XiaoyongIn this dissertation I study theories on auctions with participation costs with various information structure. Chapter II studies equilibria of second price auctions with differentiated participation costs. We consider equilibria in independent private values environments where bidders? entry costs are common knowledge while valuations are private information. We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a higher cutoff point for submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a lower cutoff point. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the equilibrium is unique for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions with some additional conditions. There exists a neg-monotonic equilibrium when the distribution function is strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limit status of equilibria when the difference in bidders' participation costs approaches zero. Chapter III studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogenous. Moreover, we identify a sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a heterogeneous economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant models in the literature as special cases. Chapter IV characterizes equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies in which each bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to a critical value. It is shown that, when bidders are homogenous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are concave. However, when distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. We find similar results when bidders are heterogenous.