Browsing by Subject "Wisdom."
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Item Asceticism, the sage, and the evil inclination : points of contact between Jews and Christians in late antiquity.(2010-06-23T12:23:27Z) Pendergrass, David W.; Williams, Daniel H.; Religion.; Baylor University. Dept. of Religion.In Jewish Christian comparative studies, especially concerning late antiquity, there exists a need to explore in more detail the ways in which Jews and Christians interacted religiously and socially. Scholars have hinted at the need to address salient issues in the histories of both Judaism and Christianity predicated upon their shared religious experience. The thesis of this dissertation is that natural asceticism, the sociological and religious role of the sage, and the anthropological belief in the evil inclination are three aspects shared between predominate groups of Jews and Christians in late antiquity. This dissertation argues the following things concerning why these three aspects are similar in late antiquity: (1) the similar social and religious environment which promoted ascetic practice as the means by which a person experienced salvation; (2) the increased role and perception of the biblical sage in late antiquity, which was often linked with ascetic practices; (3) the increased role that wisdom played in both Jewish and Christian minds as necessary to increase piety and achieve salvation; (4) the shared anthropological beliefs that each person was a unity of two, morally responsible halves, and that each person possessed an evil inclination which required some form of rigorous behavior to protect the purity of body and (especially the) soul. The role of the sage included passing on the necessary wisdom in the form of oral and written tradition that Jews and Christians needed not only to interpret the Bible correctly, but to achieve necessary levels of piety required for salvation. By studying the ways Jews and Christians shared similar practices in late antiquity, the theological history of both groups is futher illuminated and understood.Item Emotion, evaluative perception, and epistemic goods.(2011-09-14) Pelser, Adam C.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.In contrast to the widely held view that emotions are obstacles to ideal epistemic functioning, emotions, as evaluative perceptual states, can contribute in significant ways to our achievement of valuable epistemic goods including justified beliefs, understanding, and wisdom. That emotions are evaluative perceptual states – call this the perceptual thesis of emotion – is evidenced by the extent of the structural and functional parallels between emotions and sense perceptions. Emotions, like sense perceptions, can be both original and acquired and are distinct from the sensory inputs that give rise to them; they also resemble sense perceptions in being passive, intentional mental states with propositional content and they are sources of belief, while yet not themselves beliefs. Emotion also functions in parallel ways to sense perception with respect to the achievement of epistemic justification. Emotions, like their sense perceptual analogues, can and do function as justifying reasons or evidence for beliefs – call this the justificatory thesis of emotion. The justificatory thesis of emotion best explains plausible cases of justified beliefs formed on the basis of emotional experience, as well as the fact that we enjoy justification for evaluative beliefs bearing conceptual content indicative of emotional experience. Moreover, the justificatory thesis is not undermined by any of the strongest objections raised against it; namely, that emotions seem too unreliable to justify beliefs, that emotions themselves can be justified, and that we rarely cite emotions as our reasons for believing as we do. In another significant epistemic parallel between emotion and sense perception, emotional experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of value just as sense perceptual experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of the physical world. Emotion as evaluative perception is also essential to our achievement and actualization of wisdom. Wisdom is deep, appreciative ontological understanding of that which is good (i.e., the proper objects of wonder) and it essentially involves virtuous concerns and emotion-dispositions. Indeed, not only is our initial pursuit of wisdom often prompted by an emotional experience (e.g., wonder), wisdom is also partially constituted by and initially exemplified in virtuous emotional perceptions of value.Item The wise man among the Corinthians : rethinking their wisdom in the light of ancient stoicism and studies on ancient economy.(2012-08-08) Brookins, Timothy A.; Longenecker, Bruce W.; Religion.; Baylor University. Dept. of Religion.Against recent trends, this dissertation argues that the divisive “wisdom” addressed in 1 Corinthians can be characterized most nearly as a Christian development of Stoic philosophy, espoused mainly by a few individuals among the church’s wealthier and more educated members. Though Stoic connections with the Corinthians’ wisdom have long been noted, in considering the possibility of philosophical training in the church no study to date has had recourse to the refined socio-economic data that has emerged over the last ten years. Still less has anyone attempted to cull the full breadth of evidence for the Stoic thesis from across the whole of the letter. The present dissertation attempts to draw all of this data together for the first time. The dissertation unfolds in six chapters. The first chapter offers a general introduction and a history of Corinthians scholarship on “wisdom.” Chapter 2 argues that the regnant, rhetorical thesis (to which the Stoic thesis is offered as an alternative) owes more to its account of the eminence of rhetoric in Corinth’s broader social milieu and to the methodological trends in current Corinthians scholarship than it does to careful analysis of exegetical, lexicographical, and historical details. Chapter 3 addresses the question of methodology. It is argued that reconstruction should begin, not with a mirror-reading of Paul’s denials (e.g., 1:17; 2:1, 4, 13), but rather with the full gamut of Corinthian language quoted and of Corinthian problems narrated throughout the letter. Chapter 4 attempts to construct a profile of the church’s social world, paying especial attention to the socio-economic status of church members and the question whether any may have received some formal philosophical training. Chapter 5 brings the study to its culmination. Treating the full spectrum of Corinthian language and problems seen in the letter, it is argued that an essentially Stoic perspective provides a unifying explanation for all the letter’s dominating topics, and is the only single perspective that can satisfactorily do so. Chapter 6 provides a concluding summary and reflections on why the Stoic thesis has not yet been widely accepted.