Browsing by Subject "Sophists (Greek philosophy)"
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Item The untold story about Greek rational thought: Buddhist and other Indian rationalist influences on sophist rhetoric(Texas Tech University, 2000-12) Rahula, BasnagodaDuring the fifth and the early fourth century B. C. E.. Greek Sophist rhetoricians developed rational thinking in many fields such as in epistemology, anthropology, sociology, religion, and politics. Despite the popular belief that the traditional Greek society provided the influential sources for sophist rationalists, the dissertation argues that Greeks sophist thinkers-Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Critias, and others-were mainly influenced by Buddhist and other Indian rationalist thinking that was prevalent in India prior to the rise of the Greek sophist movement. This dissertation is the first in-depth study of Buddhist and other Indian rationalist influences on Greek sophist rhetoric. After the introduction that prepares the background for the discussion in the dissertation, Chapter II deals with the natural origin and development of Indian rationality. As a reaction to the social difficulties caused by the metaphysical and ideological concepts invented by the early Hindu tradition, Indian skeptics, materialists, Jains, and Buddhists developed rational argument against Hindu beliefs. In this development, the Brahmin myths of creation, transmigration of the soul, and Brahma were challenged vigorously by the rationalist traditions. Also, the competition between the orthodox Hindu beliefs and the rationalists' free inquiry about those beliefs gave rise to other rhetorical techniques such as style, organization, and presentation of arguments. Chapter III discusses the parallel development of rational thought in Greece with attention to the possible influence of Indian concepts on Greek thinkers from the sixth century B. C. E. Attention is drawn in this chapter mainly to Pythagoras, Empedocles. and Democritus, the forefathers of Greek sophist rhetoric, as the followers of Indian rational concepts. Chapter IV discusses in detail the similarities between Indian and Greek rational thought. Here, the rationalist concepts of Protagoras, Gorgias, and several other sophist thinkers, as well as their techniques in presentation, are closely evaluated in the light of Indian rationality in order to indicate a possible Indian influences on the Older Sophists. Chapter V reveals more evidence of possible influence, easy accessibility to Indian concepts in Greece and in Persia, and the ancient routes of communication between India and Greece.Item Where is Socrates going? : The philosophy of conversion in Plato's Euthydemus.(2008-10-02T18:25:36Z) Whittington, Richard T., 1977-; Schultz, Anne-Marie, 1966-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This work examines the aim of Socratic philosophy in Plato's Euthydemus. To understand the conflict that occurs in the dialogue between Socrates and his sophistic rivals, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, one must evaluate Socrates' overarching goal and its divergence from sophistry. The author argues, however, that a sound analysis of this dialogue must go further and understand Socrates' quarrel with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as part of a larger quarrel between philosophy and the competitive values of Greek society. The two sophists in this dialogue hardly merit serious, sustained attention. They make no serious arguments and do not seem clever enough to conceal the speciousness of their method. They practice eristic controversy for only one purpose: to refute their interlocutor and move quickly to the next refutation before anyone has time to scrutinize the soundness of their frequently absurd arguments. Indeed, one might wonder why Plato spends his energy trying to discredit this absurdly clownish pair. The author argues that the brothers do not seem terribly threatening or important, but Plato's critique does not stop with them. Rather, he uses them as a caricature of Greek culture and its cult of victory and violence. In opposition to the culture's celebration of competitive values, he articulates a model of philosophical cooperation or (put differently) protreptic dialogue. Instead of aiming to win a dispute, he uses dialogue to convert his interlocutor to philosophy, a goal that diverges radically from sophistry. In this way, Socrates engages his interlocutor an intimate way, leading him patiently toward philosophy. At the same time, Socrates does not speak only to his interlocutor; he offers protreptic dialogue as a public model of discourse and an implicit critique of the city's obsession with competition and victory. Finally, the author contends that one cannot understand Socrates' philosophical goal (namely, exhorting his interlocutor to love wisdom) without understanding his sense of divine mission. In the Euthydemus Socrates begins with the divine sign, which sustains his sense of mission and purpose even when his protreptic dialogues terminate in aporia.