Browsing by Subject "Problem of evil"
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Item A place for moral theory in the argument from evil(2012-08) Reed, Robert P; Webb, Mark O.; Schwartz, JeremyArguments from evil intend to prove that the existence of an all-powerful and morally-perfect being would preclude the existence of evil. Such arguments hold that the absence of evil is a necessary consequence of a morally-perfect and all-powerful being existing. Yet evil does exist and so by modus tollens, God must not. Despite the presence of unmistakably moral terms in these arguments such as “evil” and “morally-perfect”, treatments of the problem of evil in the philosophical literature have avoided discussing the related normative and metaethical issues and so have hindered the progress of the debate. Whether or not the attributes of being all-powerful and being morally-perfect do in fact preclude the existence of evil is substantially (if not entirely) determined by the moral or normative structure of the world: the moral truths about good, evil, normativity, right action etc. and any properties and facts about the world needed to ground them (supposing moral truths require such grounding). So the very same truths moral philosophers seek while doing normative ethics will largely determine whether the existence of a morally-perfect and omnipotent being precludes the existence of evil. The truth about God and evil hinges upon the truth about morality. Thus, the question of whether or not God and evil can coexist cannot be answered without committing to the sorts of normative claims at issue in moral philosophy.Item All creation groans : a theodicy for suffering animals.(2015-03-24) Douglass, Matthew K., 1981-; Kvanvig, Jonathan L.Philosophers and theologians have long tried to reconcile belief in a perfect God with the fact of widespread, horrific, and seemingly pointless suffering. However, relatively little thought has been given to animal suffering, which, though perhaps less significant than human suffering, nevertheless raises serious questions about God’s goodness. Many of the reasons given for why God allows human suffering do not seem to apply to animals. Their suffering (in this life at least) does not teach them any profound lessons, facilitate moral development, or draw them closer to God. Indeed, the thought that God is responsible for the world and all its miseries—that he made a world full of natural disasters, famine, diseases, and predation, that he seems utterly indifferent to the suffering of innocent animals—tends to provoke a sense of moral protest. This dissertation will develop and attempt to answer two arguments against God, each based on moral outrage at animal suffering. I will discuss some of the commonly-given reasons why God would create a harsh world like ours, rather than a more idyllic one and why God allows particularly horrific evils that do not seem to serve any good purpose. While some of these insights help calm my moral outrage somewhat, I will argue that they are unsuccessful by themselves. Thus, I conclude that if God is loving and if God is worthy of faith and worship, then there is good reason to think that God will redeem animal suffering in heaven.