Browsing by Subject "Political theory."
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Item Balancing liberty of contract with police power : a Hobbesian approach.(2011-05-12T15:46:09Z) Pope, Thomas R., 1983-; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.Modern liberal society exists by negotiating a fine balance between the liberty of the citizen and the authority of the state. Yet, as the years put distance between our founding principles and their execution, we have become forgetful of the symbiosis that unites individual and common goods. Particularly in American jurisprudence, we see a growing antagonism between personal liberties and the state's ability to act in the interest of the whole (known as its "police power"). The first and paradigmatic contest between these principles can be traced to the Lochner v. New York and its later repudiation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. Lochner and its ilk tend to overemphasize the interest of liberty at the expense of the public good. West Coast Hotel, on the other hand, so vehemently rejects the most radical components of Lochner that government regulation on behalf of the public good effectually supersedes even moderate liberty interests. Both approaches recur throughout the Court's history, and yet fail to achieve the necessary balance of liberty and the public good because they consider the matter as a dichotomy. My dissertation will explore our constitution's roots in social contract theory, looking particularly to the thought of Thomas Hobbes for a third option that is consistent with the language and tradition of the Constitution, and is also more effectually viable than existing alternatives. Within a framework of social contract, individual liberty finds its fullest expression within the political community, which in turn exists to promote individual flourishing. When one is favored at the expense of the other, both must suffer. I begin with a review of the existing jurisprudence on the matter, highlighting the role and influence of Lochner. I then proceed to identify elements of Hobbesian social contract in the Constitution, discussing how to interpret these provisions in light of their philosophic roots. This section includes a brief explanation of why Hobbes is preferred here to the more traditional Lockean reading. Finally, I conclude with an examination of more recent cases before the Court, applying the method I have set forth.Item Competing schemas within the American liberal democracy : an interdisciplinary analysis of differing perceptions of church and state.(2013-09-16) Holzer, Shannon.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The current understanding of liberal democracy in many academic circles includes a set of restraints on the types of justification that are accepted for the creation of coercive legislation. There is much debate over which sources should be accepted to publically justify laws touching on education and morality. Many believe that religious beliefs are outside of public reason, and they are, thus, inadequate to justify the formation of coercive laws. The reason for this is that many people perceive religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous. Because of this perception, religion has by and large been relegated to the private sphere. The perception of religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous has also become firmly engrained in the legal community. Because of this, state and federal courts tend to treat legislation that is organically connected to religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause. This dissertation argues that this perception of religion is incomplete. Those who perceive religion as irrational, dangerous, and divisive somehow do not recognize its reasonable, peaceful, and unifying aspects. Furthermore, the problems popularly attributed to religious reason are not unique to religion. Secular reasoning can also be irrational, dangerous, and divisive. Ultimately, religious reasoning may indeed have a place in the formation of coercive legislation that is tolerable to its detractors. The incorporation of religious reasoning does not entail an all-out theocracy as many might fear. Given that the fundamental principles of liberal democracy are often grounded on religious premises, to require restraint of religious reasoning would be to remove the foundation of liberal principles on which this country stands. Furthermore, it would violate a key tenet of liberal democracy that all should be treated free and equal by placing a burden on the religious citizen that is not shared by the non-religious citizen.Item The other as friend : a platonic response to the political thought of Jacques Derrida.(2012-08-08) Dinan, Matthew D.; Nichols, Mary P.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation presents a critical examination of the political thought of Jacques Derrida, suggesting that some of its aims are better realized by Plato. I argue that Derrida's late political works respond to a concern expressed in his early essay, "Plato's Pharmacy," where he suggests that Plato suppressed the subversive insights of philosophy, merely "deciding" to preserve the possibility of hierarchical order in politics. Derrida's explicitly political works identify the same Platonic logic of "closure" in Western political thought's prioritization of the "self" or "commensurability" to the other or "incommensurability." Such closure runs the risk of a nihilistic denial of the ultimate incommensurability: future time. Derrida responds to this politico-philosophical crisis through his notion of "democracy to come," in which he argues that democracy is never fully present, because it alternates between its irreconcilable principles of equality and freedom, in turn. Democracy is thus the one regime receptive to the radically incommensurable future or "to come." While Derrida's efforts to disrupt the nihilistic denial of the future in his political thought are admirable, his account relies heavily on a problematic conception of the self, assumes receptivity to the other to be incompatible with meaningful political limitations, and oversimplifies the Western tradition of political thought in both of these regards. In response, I return to the origin of Derrida's political interventions: the dialogues of Plato. I first examine the Sophist, arguing that Plato preempts Derrida's suggestion that he suppresses philosophy in the name of political order by criticizing the Eleatic Stranger's diacritical ontology for its inability to censure sophistry without recourse to the very decisionism Derrida supposes Plato to recommend. Turning to the Phaedrus I argue that Plato demonstrates Socrates' superiority to the Stranger in the Athenian's recognition of the human context in which thought occurs. Furthermore, Socrates models a type of friendly openness to Phaedrus that mitigates the neutralization of the incommensurable other feared by Derrida, while at the same time providing a foundation for meaningful politico-philosophical limitations. Plato thus offers a model of politico-philosophical openness through which it is possible to better obtain the political goals of Derrida.