Browsing by Subject "Naive realism"
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Item Biased judgment and decision making in constituents evaluating representatives in negotiation(2015-05) Willard, Daniel Francis Xavier, Jr.; Markman, Arthur B.; Henderson, MarloneResearch in representative negotiation has sought to understand how relationships between representatives and their constituents influence the negotiation process. While much of this research has focused negotiations once the representative has been selected, little attention has been paid to how constituents select their representatives, and how their performance is evaluated. The present work shows that constituents are biased towards selecting representatives whose offers are in line with their expectations for a negotiation, and that this bias affects their performance evaluations and likelihood of being rehired regardless of the negotiation's outcome. In Study 1, I show initial evidence for this effect using an ultimatum game design. Study 2 elaborates upon Study 1 by demonstrating that the direction of difference between expectations and offers does not influence constituent judgment or behavior. Study 3 shows that the effect holds across time and constituents do not learn to overcome the bias, while ruling out experience as an alternate explanation. I discuss these findings by drawing from the theory of naïve realism, providing implications for theory and practice of representative negotiation.Item The intellectual given(2010-05) Bengson, John Thomas Steele; Sosa, David, 1966-; Bealer, George; Dancy, Jonathan; Pautz, Adam; Sainsbury, Mark; Tye, MichaelSome things we know just by thinking about them: for example, that identity is transitive, that three are more than two, that wantonly torturing innocents is wrong, and other propositions which simply strike us as true when we consider them. But how? This essay articulates and defends a rationalist answer which critically develops a significant analogy between intuition and perception. The central thesis is that intuition and perception, though different, are at a certain level of abstraction the same kind of state, and states of this kind are, by their very nature, poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justified and even knowledgeable belief without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as given. The essay proceeds in three stages. Stage one advances a fully general and psychologically realistic account of the nature of intuition, namely, as an intellectual presentation of an apparent truth. Stage two provides a modest treatment of the epistemic status of intuition, in particular, how intuition serves as a source of immediate prima facie justification. Stage three outlines a response to Benacerraf-style worries about intuitive knowledge regarding abstract objects (e.g., numbers, sets, and values); the proposal is a constitutive, rather than causal, explanation of the means by which a given intuition connects a thinker to the fact intuited.