Browsing by Subject "Justice (Virtue)"
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Item Is “social justice” justice? : A Thomistic argument for “social persons” as the proper subjects of the virtue of social justice.(2008-10-15T14:21:42Z) Lee, John R. (Richard), 1981-; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The term “social justice,” as it occurs in the Catholic social encyclical tradition, presents a core, definitional problem. According to Catholic social thought, social justice has social institutions as its subjects. However, in the Thomistic tradition, justice is understood to be a virtue, i.e., a human habit with human persons as subjects. Thus, with its non-personal subjects, social justice would seem not to be a virtue, and thus not to be a true form of justice. We offer a solution to this problem, based on the idea of social personhood. Drawing from the Thomistic understanding of “person” as a being “distinct in a rational nature”, it is argued that certain social institutions—those with a unity of order—are capable of meeting Aquinas’ analogical definition of personhood. Thus, social institutions with a unity of order—i.e., societies—are understood to be “social persons” and thus the proper subjects of virtue, including the virtue of justice. After a review of alternative conceptions, it is argued that “social justice” in the Catholic social encyclical tradition is best understood as general justice (justice directed toward the common good) extended to include not only human persons, but social persons as well. Advantages of this conception are highlighted. Metaphysically, an understanding of social justice as exercised by social persons fits nicely with an understanding of society as non-substantial, but subsistent being. This understanding of societal being supports certain intuitions we have about the nature of societal organization. In regards to social philosophy, an understanding of social justice as general justice exercised by social persons helps to account for the principle of subsidiarity and situate it properly within the domain of just acts. Consequently, the notion of social personhood helps to bring social institutions—considered per se, not as mere summations of individual persons—into the domain of justice.Item Like the green bay tree : the necessity of virtue for happiness.(2009-06-01T20:17:59Z) Wise, Jonathan D. Sands.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.It is a generally accepted truth that the wicked flourish, as the psalmist has it, "like the green bay tree": their evil ways, far from hurting them, actually contribute to their well-being and vicious contentedness. From Socrates till Kant, on the other hand, every major moral philosopher believed that a person had to be virtuous to be happy. I explore why Aristotle accepted this thesis and the role that it played in his account of the good life, then turn to our contemporary accounts of happiness to determine if our concept shares any similarities with that employed by Aristotle. Happiness, most contemporary accounts would have it, is nothing more than a psychological state; I argue that this is reductive and that we still share much of Aristotle’s perspective wherein happiness tracks objective features of our character and fit with our environment as well. Even if I am right about happiness, why should we accept that virtue is necessary for happiness? Joseph Butler, though often misunderstood, provides significant support for this thesis using specific theistic premises, which, unfortunately, are no longer available to us today. Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre, on the other hand, provide a complex account of ethics that allows us to respond to the serious challenges our central thesis still faces, most notably cultural relativism and the apparent counterexamples provided by the green bay trees that surround us all. I conclude that there is substantial support for the thesis that some list of virtues, explorable but not entirely known by us, is necessary for the sort of happiness that we are concerned to plan for and achieve in our ethical lives, and that virtue ethics should accept this thesis as it has several important roles to play, especially in education and reflective endorsement. Justice, as a personal virtue, proves an interesting test case as I explore whether it particularly is necessary for happiness.