Browsing by Subject "Justice (Philosophy)"
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Item Force and persuasion in Plato's Republic.(2009-08-25T16:24:18Z) Pearson, Lewis Takashi.; Schultz, Anne-Marie, 1966-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Plato’s Republic begins with an act of force (327b) and ends with an act of persuasion (621c). Between these two bookends, force and persuasion appear well over one hundred more times, permeating the dialogue as recurring themes. Force and persuasion are present in the dialogue primarily as a means for Socrates to provide his interlocutors a proper understanding of human nature, which when fully explicated includes an account of the nature of reality and the good. For the reader, the presence of force and persuasion throughout the dialogue is a constant reminder of its importance as a hermeneutical key for properly interpreting the content and purpose of Socrates’ speech. By focusing on the use and discussion of force and persuasion throughout Plato’s Republic, I argue that Socrates attempts "truly to persuade" his interlocutors "that it is in every way better to be just rather than unjust" (357b), primarily by correcting their misconceptions of human nature. To persuade his interlocutors, Socrates makes visible the invisible soul through the extensive use of images and analogies. I show that one can use Socrates’ definitions of force, persuasion, and wizardry as a hermeneutical key for interpreting all of the major themes, images, and analogies of the Republic.Item Is “social justice” justice? : A Thomistic argument for “social persons” as the proper subjects of the virtue of social justice.(2008-10-15T14:21:42Z) Lee, John R. (Richard), 1981-; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The term “social justice,” as it occurs in the Catholic social encyclical tradition, presents a core, definitional problem. According to Catholic social thought, social justice has social institutions as its subjects. However, in the Thomistic tradition, justice is understood to be a virtue, i.e., a human habit with human persons as subjects. Thus, with its non-personal subjects, social justice would seem not to be a virtue, and thus not to be a true form of justice. We offer a solution to this problem, based on the idea of social personhood. Drawing from the Thomistic understanding of “person” as a being “distinct in a rational nature”, it is argued that certain social institutions—those with a unity of order—are capable of meeting Aquinas’ analogical definition of personhood. Thus, social institutions with a unity of order—i.e., societies—are understood to be “social persons” and thus the proper subjects of virtue, including the virtue of justice. After a review of alternative conceptions, it is argued that “social justice” in the Catholic social encyclical tradition is best understood as general justice (justice directed toward the common good) extended to include not only human persons, but social persons as well. Advantages of this conception are highlighted. Metaphysically, an understanding of social justice as exercised by social persons fits nicely with an understanding of society as non-substantial, but subsistent being. This understanding of societal being supports certain intuitions we have about the nature of societal organization. In regards to social philosophy, an understanding of social justice as general justice exercised by social persons helps to account for the principle of subsidiarity and situate it properly within the domain of just acts. Consequently, the notion of social personhood helps to bring social institutions—considered per se, not as mere summations of individual persons—into the domain of justice.