Browsing by Subject "Judicial politics"
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Item Democratic governance and the courts : the political sources of the judicialization of public policy in Argentina(2011-08) Ryan, Daniel Eduardo; Brinks, Daniel M., 1961-; Hunter, Wendy; Madrid, Raul; Perry, H. W.; Werksman, Jacob; Weyland, KurtThe purpose of this dissertation is to examine under what political conditions public policy issues are likely to become judicialized in Argentina. This study shows that the most widespread theoretical explanation, the loser argument, is too general and does not provide much analytical insight about the relationship between the political context and the judicialization of policy. Meanwhile, other explanations developed by the literature, mainly the politically disadvantaged group and the fragmented legislative power, although theoretically valid, have a limited empirical coverage and cannot fully explain the phenomenon of policy judicialization in Argentina. Taking into account the limitations and contributions of the existing theories, the theoretical argument of this dissertation is predicated upon the idea that there are various, alternative political scenarios under which judicialization is likely to occur. In other words, there is not just one, but several, different political conditions or combinations of conditions that might trigger the involvement of courts in public policy. Within this conceptual framework, the dissertation argues that policy disputes are likely to become judicialized under two political scenarios which have not been considered by the existing literature: first, when the state apparatus is unable to implement or enforce policy goals and mandates already approved by the political branches of government, and second, when the political elites in charge of the executive do not fully support existing policy mandates, and the legislature is too passive or deferential to the government regarding that policy issue. In these types of political contexts, social actors are likely to judicialize their policy claims. To assess these arguments, the dissertation develops a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 13 major policy conflicts that occurred in Argentina during the last two decades, complemented by case studies. As a result of my analysis, I identify three combinations of political conditions that are sufficient to trigger the judicialization of policy in Argentina. Two of these combinations clearly fit with my theoretical argument and expectations about what political scenarios are likely to lead to policy judicialization, while the third combination closely reflects the political disadvantage argument.Item High-end demand : markets for legal services and pressure for judicial autonomy in urban China(2015-05) Kinkel, Jonathan Josef; Brinks, Daniel M., 1961-; Hurst, William, 1975-; Elkins, Zachary; Maclachlan, Patricia; Perry, H.W.Most scholars of comparative judicial politics suggest that judicial autonomy emerges from various forms of democratic competition or from a need to assuage the concerns of those investing capital in countries controlled by authoritarian regimes. In an authoritarian political system where the Party-State has historically sought to monopolize control over judicial selection and promotion, how can we explain reforms that increase the degree of merit-based competition, the statutory basis of written judicial opinions, the level of court transparency, and overall judicial autonomy in courts? Challenging prevailing theories regarding the relationship between economic development and rule of law, I argue that the particular patterns of local variation in judicial autonomy across urban China can be traced in part to differences in local markets for professional legal services: if qualified, mid-ranking judges can easily quit their jobs and find lucrative local employment as lawyers, court leaders are more likely to strategically reform promotion mechanisms in an attempt to retain these young—yet nonetheless, experienced—judges. These findings are based on nearly 15 months of in-country fieldwork, conducted between 2012-2014, that included 49 interviews with judges across 3 different case study cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chengdu. Employing the subnational comparative method, this article not only builds theory regarding the emergence of rule of law in authoritarian states, it also offers new empirical detail regarding the promotion, performance evaluation, and behavior of judges in urban China.