Browsing by Subject "Irony."
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Item Augustine against the academic doctrine, way of life, and use of philosophical writing.(2013-09-16) Spano, John; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Foley, Michael P., 1970-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The recent literature on Augustine’s Contra Academicos stresses the philosophical, ethical, and literary elements of the text. However, these works neglect the polemical role of the dialogue as a response to Cicero’s Academic Skepticism. I offer a reading of the first of Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues, the Contra Academicos, that shows how his work can be read as a comprehensive rejection of the Academic philosophical life and doctrine as presented in Cicero’s dialogue, the Academica. To accomplish the goal, the work begins with an analysis of the doctrine in, way of life recommended by, and pedagogical function of Cicero’s Academica. The remaining chapters examine Augustine’s response to each of these elements of Cicero’s work. In Chapter Three I accentuate the philosophical importance of Augustine’s accusation that the Academics practiced a form of esotericism. This accusation, largely neglected, helps underscore Augustine’s rhetorical strategies to cultivate in his students an awareness of philosophical ironic discourse. Chapter Four focuses upon Augustine’s critique of the Academic way of life and the problems that arise from their insistence that all must seek wisdom yet be content with the inevitable impossibility of finding wisdom. Chapters Five and Six examine Augustine’s positive contributions to philosophical writing. Augustine rejects the Academic emphasis that wisdom must be sought by reason alone, suggesting that reason and authority are the twin means for that pursuit. The dual emphasis disallows Augustine from pedagogical uses of deception in the dialogue form, a subtle but important shift from other philosophical uses of this form of writing. By allowing reason and authority to guide one in the pursuit of wisdom, Augustine’s work also steers the reader away from the despair that Academic skepticism can so easily cultivate.Item The legitimacy of the comic : Kierkegaard and the importance of the comic for his ethics and theology.(2011-12-19) Williams, Will (George Willis); Martens, Paul Henry.; Religion.; Baylor University. Dept. of Religion.While some consider the comic to be a trivial subject, fit mainly for amusement or distraction, Søren Kierkegaard disagrees. This dissertation examines Kierkegaard’s understanding of the nature of the comic and how he believes even the triviality of comic jest to be deeply tied to ethical and theological earnestness. First, I examine Kierkegaard’s understanding of the comic, irony, and humor, drawing primarily from Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). I argue that, for Kierkegaard, the comic is a contradiction or misrelation that is essentially though not absolutely painless, providing a “way out.” The comic is a contradiction between norms, suggesting that it springs from one’s perspective in a way that holds important implications for one’s ethical and theological worldview. Kierkegaard believes that subjective development is closely tied to one’s capacity to perceive the comic, making the comic both diagnostic of and formative for one’s subjective state. For him, the Christian is far from humorless, instead having the maximum human capacity to perceive the comic. Next, I show that the previously argued conception of the comic can be found in other works by Kierkegaard: Prefaces (1844), Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (1847), and the Corsair affair (c.1845-1848). Then, I examine representatives of the Deconstructionist tradition of reading Kierkegaard, namely Louis Mackey, Roger Poole, Elsebet Jegstrup, and Mark C. Taylor. I argue that, while they accurately perceive the widespread irony in Kierkegaard’s corpus, they incorrectly conclude that such irony is a sign of his lack of earnest interest in philosophy and theology. Their conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of what Kierkegaard believes the nature of irony to be. Finally, I consider two contemporary representatives of the tradition of reading Kierkegaard theologically, namely Murray Rae and W. Glenn Kirkconnell. I argue that, while their instincts regarding Kierkegaard are generally preferable to those of the Deconstructionist tradition, they lack the latter’s awareness of Kierkegaard’s use of the comic and willingness to let it influence their conclusions. Their already significant arguments would, I suggest, be strengthened and extended with an increased appreciation for the legitimate function that Kierkegaard believes the comic to play for ethics and theology.