Browsing by Subject "Institutional investors"
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Item Anatomy of institutional investors: preferences, performance, and clienteles(2001-08) Binay, Murat Mehmet; Starks, Laura T.Item Do institutional investors and financial analysts impact bank financial reporting quality?(2015-05) Yust, Christopher Gordon Edward; Yu, Yong, Ph. D.High quality financial reporting is critically important for bank regulation, particularly market discipline, but limited evidence exists on why banks provide different levels of financial reporting quality. I examine whether institutional investors and financial analysts impact bank financial reporting quality. Although I find no impact of analysts on bank financial reporting quality, institutional ownership is positively associated with financial reporting quality, and this relation is strongest for banks with high information asymmetry and for “monitoring” institutional investors. Institutional investors also sell shares following the announcement of a restatement, suggesting they are willing to use the threat of exit as a mechanism to influence bank managers and demand financial reporting quality. Finally, I find institutional investors demand financial reporting quality primarily for high risk banks and also reduce ex-ante bank risk and ex-post non-performing loans. Collectively, these results suggest institutional investors are an important component of bank governance.Item Essays on social values in finance(2011-05) Page, Jeremy Kenneth; Kumar, Alok; Titman, Sheridan; Parrino, Robert; Sialm, Clemens; Spalt, OliverThis dissertation consists of three essays on the role of social values in financial markets. Chapter 1 uses geographic variation in religious concentration to identify the effect of people's gambling behavior in financial market settings. We argue that religious background predicts people's gambling propensity, and that gambling propensity carries over into their behavior in financial markets. We test this conjecture in various financial market settings and find that the predominant local religion predicts variation in investors' propensity to hold stocks with lottery features, in the prevalence of broad-based employee stock option plans, in first-day returns to initial public offerings, and in the magnitude of the negative lottery-stock return premium. Collectively, our findings indicate that religious beliefs regarding the acceptability of gambling impact investors' portfolio choices, corporate decisions, and stock returns. In Chapter 2 I examine the impact of social norms against holding certain types of stocks (e.g. "sin stocks", or stocks with lottery features) on trading decisions and portfolio performance. I argue that trades which deviate from social norms are likely to reflect stronger information. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that the most gambling-averse institutions earn high abnormal returns on their holdings of lottery stocks, outperforming the holdings of the most gambling-tolerant institutions. An analysis of institutions' sin stock holdings provides complementary evidence using another dimension of social norms, supporting the hypothesis that trades which deviate from norms reflect stronger information. In the third essay, we conjecture that people feel more optimistic about the economy and stock market when their own political party is in power. We find supporting evidence from Gallup survey data and analyze brokerage account data to confirm the impact of time-varying optimism on investors' portfolio choices. When the political climate is aligned with their political preferences, investors maintain higher systematic risk exposure while trading less frequently. When the opposite party is in power, investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases and make worse investment decisions. Investors improve their raw portfolio performance when their own party is in power, but the risk-adjusted improvement is economically small.Item Essays on the impact of institutional investors on market efficiency and corporate policies(2008-05) Sulaeman, Johan Arifin; Altı, Aydoğan; Titman, SheridanIn this dissertation, I explore the determinants and implications of the preferences of institutional investors. First, I examine whether institutional investors' preference for local investments is related to informational advantage. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large sample of actively managed mutual funds, I find evidence consistent with the mutual fund industry having a perception that local funds have an informational advantage. However, the portfolio of mutual funds' local holdings does not display significant superior performance relative to the portfolio of their distant holdings. Using a parsimonious model, I hypothesize that the profitability of local informational advantage will be low due to the price impact of trading when there is a relatively large population of local agents who trade on similar private information. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that funds do earn superior returns on local stocks for which local capital is limited and hence the price impact of local trades is likely to be small. Second, I examine the preferences of institutional investors for firm policies and the relationship between these preferences and firm decisions. I find that institutional investors exhibit systematic differences in their preferences for financial and investment policies. Furthermore, these preferences are related to subsequent changes in the financial and investment policies of the firms they invest. In particular, a firm is more likely to decrease (increase) its leverage ratio if its current leverage is higher (lower) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. A firm is also more likely to increase (decrease) its investment if its current investment ratio is lower (higher) than the preferences of its institutional shareholders. These findings suggest that the preferences of institutional shareholders are important determinants of corporate policies.Item Three studies on the timing of investment advisers' loss realizations(2008-08) Sikes, Stephanie Ann, 1976-; Robinson, John Richard; Clement, Michael B.In this dissertation, I use a unique data set to address three questions related to the timing of loss realizations by institutional investors. The data include clienteles and quarterly holdings of investment advisers, whom I classify as "tax-sensitive" if their clients are primarily high net-worth individuals and as "tax-insensitive" if their clients are primarily tax-exempt entities or individuals with tax-deferred accounts. Prior empirical studies attribute abnormal stock return patterns around calendar year-end (the "January effect") to individual investors' tax-loss-selling and to institutional investors' window-dressing. In chapter two, I examine whether investment advisers contribute to the January effect via tax-loss-selling rather than via windowdressing. I find that tax-sensitive advisers' year-end sales of loss stocks (but not those of tax-exempt client advisers whose detailed disclosures to clients provide more incentive to window-dress) are associated with abnormally low (high) returns at the end of December (beginning of January). These results suggest that investment advisers contribute to the January effect via tax-loss-selling rather than via window-dressing. In chapter three, I examine whether tax-sensitive advisers respond to holding period incentives at year-end. Under U.S. tax law, net short-term gains are taxed as ordinary income, while net long-term gains are taxed at a lower rate. Prior studies find little or no response to holding period incentives by individual investors. In contrast, tax-sensitive advisers are more likely to sell stocks with short-term losses the larger the difference between the current short-term loss deduction and what the long-term loss deduction would be. In chapter four, I examine whether, like individual investors, tax-sensitive advisers realize their losses at year-end because they exhibit the "disposition effect," or the tendency to realize gains at a quicker rate than losses, earlier in the year. I compare the likelihood of advisers' realizations of "losers" (stocks the cumulative return of which over the prior nine months is negative) to the likelihood of their realizations of "winners" (stocks the cumulative return of which over the prior nine months is positive) by calendar quarter. Tax-insensitive, but not tax-sensitive, advisers exhibit the disposition effect, suggesting that tax incentives combined with investor sophistication prevent the disposition effect.Item Two essays on stock liquidity(2008-08) Liu, Shuming, doctor of finance; Titman, SheridanThis dissertation consists of two empirical essays on investor behavior and liquidity variation. The results demonstrate the important role of investors in affecting liquidity. The first essay examines how the fluctuation in the aggregate stock market liquidity is related to investor sentiment. I find that the stock market is more liquid when investor sentiment is higher. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction that higher investor sentiment increases stock market liquidity. The second essay investigates whether the cross-sectional differences in liquidity are affected by institutional ownership. I document that stocks with larger increases in the number of institutional investors are more liquid than other stocks. This result is consistent with the prediction that information competition among institutional investors increases stock liquidity.Item Two essays on stock preference and performance of institutional investors(2008-08) Xu, Jin, doctor of finance; Titman, Sheridan; Griffin, John M. (John Meredith), 1970-Two essays on the stock preference and performance of institutional investors are included in the dissertation. In the first essay, I document that mutual fund managers and other institutional investors tend to hold stocks with higher betas. This effect holds even after precisely controlling for stocks’ risk characteristics such as size, book-to-market equity ratio and momentum. This is contrary to the widely accepted view that betas are no longer associated with expected returns. However, these results support my simple model where a fund manager’s payoff function depends on returns in excess of a benchmark. For the manager, on the one hand, he tends to load up with high beta stocks since he wants to co-move with the market and other factors as much as possible. On the other hand, the manager faces a trade-off between expected performance and the volatility of tracking error. My model thus shows that the manager prefers to choose higher beta than his benchmark, and that his beta choice has an optimal level which depends on his perceived factor returns and volatility. My empirical findings further confirm the model results. First, I show that the effect of managers holding higher beta stocks is robust to a number of alternative explanations including the effects of their liquidity selection or trading activities. Second, consistent with the model predictions of managers sticking close to their benchmarks during risky periods, I demonstrate that the average beta choice of mutual fund managers can predict future market volatility, even after controlling for other common volatility predictors, such as lagged volatility and implied volatility. The second essay is the first to explicitly address the performance of actively managed mutual funds conditioned on investor sentiment. Almost all fund size quintiles subsequently outperform the market when sentiment is low while all of them underperform the market when sentiment is high. This also holds true after adjusting the fund returns by various performance benchmarks. I further show that the impact of investor sentiment on fund performance is mostly due to small investor sentiment. These findings can partially validate the existence of actively managed mutual funds which underperform the market overall (Gruber 1996). In addition, when conditioning on investor sentiment, the pattern of decreasing returns to scale in mutual funds, recently documented in Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), is fully reversed when sentiment is high while the pattern persists and is more pronounced when sentiment is low. Further results suggest that smaller funds tend to hold smaller stocks, which is shown to drive the above patterns. I also document that smaller funds have more sentiment timing ability or feasibility than larger funds. These findings have many important implications including persistence of fund performance which may not exist under conventional performance measures.Item Two essays on the corporate governance for real estate investment trusts (REITs)(2006) Sun, Libo; Titman, Sheridan; Hartzell, JayEssay one investigates the relation between firms’ investment choices and various governance mechanisms, using a sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). We find evidence that the responsiveness of REITs’ investment expenditures to their opportunities depends on their corporate governance structures. Within the set of governance mechanisms that we examine, we find particularly strong links between investment behavior and ownership. Specifically, we find that the investment choices of REITs are more closely tied to Tobin’s q if they have greater institutional ownership, or lower director and officer stock ownership. These results are consistent with institutional owners monitoring the firm’s investment policies, and with high insider ownership allowing managers to follow their own investment agendas. Essay two reexamines the diversification discount using a sample of REITs from 1995 to 2003. We investigate the wealth effect of diversification across property type and regional locations. We find that regional diversification has a significant negative impact on firm value. Examining the determinants of corporate diversification, we discover that past growth opportunities are negatively related to the probability of diversifying choices. Moreover, this effect is mitigated in firms with high institutional ownership. This is consistent with the agency cost hypothesis that managers engage in buying-growth diversification and institutions could reduce the probability of such behavior. The influence of institutional investors has a significant value impact as well: firms with high institutional ownership are associated with lower regional diversification discount. Within two institutional sub-groups -- potentially active and passive monitoring institutions, it is potentially active ones that display such value impact, not the potentially passive ones. We conduct several tests to distinguish two hypotheses: that institutions play a monitoring role, or they selectively hold shares of certain firms. The results from simultaneous equation models support the monitoring story. Last, we also investigate the effect of other governance variables in firms’ diversifying choices and the diversification discount. We find that direct effect of other governance variables on diversifying decision is weak. Yet, as a group they significantly influence the regional diversification discount.