Browsing by Subject "Game theory"
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Item A methodology to improve the cooperative performance of hedonistic multi-agents(Texas Tech University, 2006-12) Helm, Michael T.; Cooke, Daniel E.; Becker, Klaus G.; Pyeatt, Larry D.; Rushton, J. NelsonMulti-agent systems have several performance advantages over monolithic systems, among them are: improved speed performance, spatial distribution, reduction of single point failures, and both diversity and redundancy of capability. Such systems are often difficult to design and manage due to the complexity of coordination. The communications overhead cost to achieve coordination becomes intractable as the number of agents grows large. Yet, cooperative behavior has been shown to emerge from the interactions of simple multi-agents that use self-serving fixed-action patterns. Social insects are the inspiration for this work, which explores the value of constrained communication in simple hedonistic multi-agents for the purpose of improving their summed performance from the total system level view. The objective of this work is to develop a better understanding of the influence of communication in achieving improved cooperative system level performance among self-serving agents. This work includes development of an agent/world model and three experimental studies, the last one of which focuses on the cost/value of communications.Item A study of the Turkish automobile industry: a game theoretical approach(Texas Tech University, 2000-05) Ozsahin, Oguz SuaviIn this dissertation we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of price and non-price competition of firms in the Turkish Automobile Industry. In the past, this industry has been highly protected from foreign competition and shielded from competitive developments of the world market. The 1990's, however, brought about significant changes in the Turkish Automobile industry with respect to quality standards, degree of competition, and degree of product differentiation as a result of relaxed trade restrictions. An important question to ask is what, if any, are the effects of these changes in the market environment with respect to the price and non-price competition of the firms? We are trying to find an answer to this question by applying what is known as the New Empirical Industrial Organization "NEIO". While using this new approach is by itself an important contribution, an additional and perhaps even more important contribution of this study lies in the fact that there are no empirical studies with respect to the Turkish Automobile Industry. The few studies that do exist do not go beyond a mere description of the industry structure. Therefore, the research at hand is rather unique in both its methodology and scope. The empirical work is based on a game theoretic model and the utilized data set is rather unique and not readily available. By estimating alternative hypothetical market games and testing the validity of these games for the Turkish Automobile industry, we conclude that the Turkish Automobile industry is best viewed as an industry in which there is a leader-follower relationship between the firms.Item Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks(2013-08-28) Ramaswamy Pillai, VinodRecent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these models is that the participants in the network are willing to cooperate with the system. However, there are many instances where the incentives to cooperate is missing. Then, the agents may seek to achieve their own private interests by behaving strategically. Often, such selfish choices lead to inefficient equilibrium state of the system, commonly known as the tragedy of commons in Economics terminology. Now, one may ask the following question: how can the system be led to the socially optimal state in spite of selfish behaviors of its participants? The traditional control design framework fails to provide an answer as it does not take into account of selfish and strategic behavior of the agents. The use of game theoretical methods to achieve coordination in such network systems is appealing, as it naturally captures the idea of rational agents taking locally optimal decisions. In this thesis, we explore several instances of coordination problems in communication networks that can be analyzed using game theoretical methods. We study one coordination problem each, from each layer of TCP/IP reference model - the network model used in the current Internet architecture. First, we consider societal agents taking decisions on whether to obtain content legally or illegally, and tie their behavior to questions of performance of content distribution networks. We show that revenue sharing with peers promote performance and revenue extraction from content distribution networks. Next, we consider a transport layer problem where applications compete against each other to meet their performance objectives by selfishly picking congestion controllers. We establish that tolling schemes that incentivize applications to choose one of several different virtual networks catering to particular needs yields higher system value. Hence, we propose the adoption of such virtual networks. We address a network layer question in third problem. How do the sources in a wireless network split their traffic over the available set of paths to attain the lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time? We develop a two level distributed controller that attains the optimal traffic split. Finally, we study mobile applications competing for channel access in a cellular network. We show that the mechanism where base station conducting sequence of second price auctions and providing channel access to the winner achieves the benefits of the state of art solution, Largest Queue First policy.Item Commitment and conflict(2013-12) Krainin, Colin Henry; Wiseman, Thomas E., 1974-War is an inefficient outcome and therefore states ought to prefer to bargain over areas of conflict instead of fighting. However, in the anarchy of international relations there is no actor with a monopoly of power to enforce contracts between states. States then face a commitment problem when bargaining to prevent war. This dissertation explores three models where this commitment problem can lead to war. The first chapter presents a model that allows for shifts in the distribution of power which play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This condition implies that preventive war may be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power. As theorized in power transition theory, differential rates of economic growth can potentially cause war under this mechanism. Relaxing the unitary actor assumption of the first chapter, the second chapter analyzes how the domestic institutional structure of countries affects the likelihood of war. We model institutional divergence by comparing an infinitely lived dictatorship to a democracy with a replaceable leader and allow a range of leader incentives within these institutional frameworks. We show that dictators, even welfare maximizing ones, may lead to war if the initial distribution of resources is highly imbalanced whereas a democracy with a forward looking electorate is always peaceful. Yet when a democratic electorate is myopic, preventive war may result. Political parties act as a mechanism to prevent this outcome. In the third chapter, I investigate adding a third actor to the bargaining model of war. In a static setting, the model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. When extended to a dynamic setting, changes to the system that result in alliance shifting may cause war. Additionally, alliance formation need not correspond to the static solutions, suggesting that the dynamics of power are as important as the distribution of power in alliance formation.Item Competing cultural strategies: The evolution of religion(2012-05) Ralph, David; Rice, Sean H.; Strauss, Richard E.; Durband, Arthur C.Understanding the impact of culture systems and cultural evolution is integral to understanding human evolution. Cultural systems have the property of both horizontal and vertical transmission of non-genetic highly heritable cultural phenotypes. This is particularly important when group identity is related to a specific cultural phenotype, as in religious systems. This study examines the effects of the process of conversion, in which an individual’s phenotype is changed within its generational timeframe. A game-theory approach using behavioral strategies was used to model the cultural group interactions. A stochastic simulation and a deterministic analytical framework were used to model this system. Groups that used a conversion strategy outcompeted groups that used a kill strategy unless heavily constrained. The results suggest that the ability to convert may have played a substantial role in the evolution of cultural systems such as religion and government, as well as directly impacted the direction of human evolution.Item Constructive infinitary game theory(Texas Tech University, 2001-08) Martin, David R.It is known that any open set is determinate. In this paper, we will present several constructive results. It is our goal to lay some of the foundation for future work in Constructive Infinitary Game Theory. In particular, we hope our work will lead to the construction of the winning strategy for open sets.Item Contributions of games theory in entry deterrence literature and an application of evolutionary games theory(Texas Tech University, 2001-05) Soytas, UgurIn this study we are interested in the contribution of game theory to the entry deterrence literature in the field of Industrial Organization. In the first part of this dissertation, we would like to assess the theoretical development achieved in entry deterrence after the introduction of game theory into the field. Our approach will be to summarize the game theoretic entry deterrence models that contributed to theoretical development. Since we discuss the diverse entry deterrence models in a condensed fashion, economists interested in the topic of entry deterrence may find this first part a valuable source of reference.Item Coping with dynamic membership, selfishness, and incomplete information: applications of probabilistic analysis and game theory(2008-05) Dimitrov, Nedialko B.; Plaxton, C. GregThe emergence of large scale distributed computing networks has given increased prominence to a number of algorithmic concerns, including the need to handle dynamic membership, selfishness, and incomplete information. In this document, we outline our explorations into these algorithmic issues. We first present our results on the analysis of a graph-based coupon collecvi tor process related to load balancing for networks with dynamic membership. In addition to extending the study of the coupon collector process, our results imply load balancing properties of certain distributed hash tables. Second, we detail our results on worst case payoffs when playing buyersupplier games, against many selfish, collaborating opponents. We study optimization over the set of core vectors. We show both positive and negative results on optimizing over the cores of such games. Furthermore, we introduce and study the concept of focus point price, which answers the question: If we are constrained to play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium? Finally, we present our analysis of a revenue management problem with incomplete information, the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem. In specific, we present an algorithm that delivers expected revenue within a constant of optimal in the online setting. Our results use a novel algorithm to generalize several results known for special cases of transversal matroids.Item The economics of beautification and beauty(2013-05) von Bose, Caroline Marie; Wiseman, Thomas E., 1974-The first chapter examines adolescent beauty as a potential originator of the observed wage premium for adult beauty and finds that adolescent beauty has its own separate effect on adult wages. Adolescent beauty also affects early human capital development, as evidenced by its significant impact on educational outcomes. Changes in beauty over time are shown to be positively correlated with changes in wages for full-time workers, and changes in beauty are generally not correlated with appearance-related choice variables. I explore the possibility that self-confidence and social capital are potential mechanisms through which adolescent attractiveness affects future wages but find that these do not change the magnitude of the effects of adolescent beauty, although they are of themselves significant determinants of wages. The second chapter examines the effects of personal grooming behaviors on earnings and shows evidence that these effects are due to persistent differences in preferences or productivity between workers displaying different grooming choices and not statistical discrimination on the part of employers. In a longitudinal sample of lawyers graduating from the same law school, men who wear glasses and men with facial hair face an earnings penalty in first-year income and to some extent in subsequent years. Some grooming behaviors are positively correlated with income in the 1970's cohort and negatively correlated with income in the 1980's cohort (and vice versa), suggesting that fashion signals change relatively quickly. I also find that grooming behaviors are correlated with beauty ratings and that the beauty premium is unaffected by earnings, but the estimated effects of some grooming behaviors partially result from their correlation with beauty. I do not find evidence that grooming behaviors act as a signaling mechanism in the labor market. The third chapter evaluates the claim that design piracy is beneficial to certain status-goods firms. It builds on Pesendorfer's model of fashion cycles by introducing the possibility of design imitation for a market in which designs are used as a signaling mechanism. There exist equilibria in which both the designer and imitator are active in the market, but there are no conditions under which imitation is profitable to the designer. Under some conditions the presence of a potential imitator will ensure that the designer does not produce at all.Item Essays on ad-supported business model competition, cost asymmetry and forward trading(2011-05) Ke, Xuqing; Hendricks, Kenneth; Whinston, Andrew B.; Abrevaya, Jason; Gu, Bin; Miravete, Eugenio J.; Wiseman, Thomas E.This dissertation explores several aspects of the theory in industrial organization. The first chapter builds a model with two cost asymmetric firms who not only have Cournot competition in the spot market but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. It is shown that with forward trading, low cost firm not always produces more than high cost firm. In an interior equilibrium, both total output and consumer welfare increase compared to the case without forward trading. When cost function is linear, forward trading is socially beneficial in that low cost firm has higher market share as well as profit share, and that total output, consumer welfare and social welfare increase. The second chapter analyzes duopoly firms' choices among ad-free and ad-supported service with different advertising displays: mandatory advertising where ads are integrated with the main content and cannot be dismissed by users; or optional advertising where users are allowed to dismiss ads at will. The model also takes into account the effect of consumers' heterogeneous ad tastes on their contribution to ad revenues. The results reveal that ad revenues intensify competition, suppress equilibrium prices and profits, and diminish the differentiation effect. The third chapter studies firms' business model choices and pricing decisions when they can choose to provide ad-free service, ad-supported service with cost-per-click (CPC) revenue model or cost-per-mille (CPM) revenue model, or a combination of them in monopoly or duopoly environment. It's shown that offering both types of ad-supported services is not an optimal strategy for a monopolist and that its optimal strategy is to vertically differentiate by providing an ad-supported service and an ad-free service. Furthermore, when the monopolist adopts the CPM-based ad revenue model, the price of the ad-supported service is more sensitive to increases in the marginal ad revenue than the case with the CPC-based model. In the equilibrium of competitive setting, exactly one firm offers an ad-supported service alone while the other firm offers the ad-free service with or without the same type of ad-supported service depending on the ad revenues.Item Essays on competition, cooperation, and market structures(2014-05) Lhost, Jonathan Richard; Sibley, David S. (David Summer), 1947-; Stahl, Dale O.My dissertation examines competition, cooperation, and efficiency in three market settings in which a population of economic agents interact, either directly with each other in pairwise matches, directly with firms, or with firms via a platform. In one chapter I consider a population of customers who have different valuations for a good sold by competing merchants, as well as varying preferences over the merchant from which to purchase the good and the payment form with which to make the purchase, and examine what the effects might be if a merchant placed an additional surcharge on transactions completed with a payment form that is more costly for the merchant. The cost for the merchant can vary dramatically depending on the payment form used. For example, a credit card transaction is generally more expensive for the merchant than a debit card transaction, even if the transaction is completed using the same technology and is processed over the same network (e.g., a MasterCard signature debit transaction and a MasterCard credit card transaction). Historically, with limited exceptions, merchants have been prohibited, both by law and by the contract permitting the acceptance of that network's cards, from charging customers different prices for transactions completed using different payment cards, despite the different costs these transactions impose on them. Recent concessions made by several major payment networks in response to legal challenges raises the possibility that this paradigm might change in the future. This chapter examines what the effects might be if merchants were permitted to charge customers different prices based on the payment form and whether these effects depend on differences between the merchants, such as differences in the marginal cost of providing the good. In another chapter, I consider a population of individuals made up of more-patient and less-patient types who interact directly with each other in a repeated prisoner's dilemma embedded in a search model. A player is matched anonymously with another player to play a prisoner's dilemma game repeatedly until the match is ended, either exogenously or endogenously by one of the players, at which point each player may receive another random match. I first determine when it is feasible to achieve the best outcome in which all players cooperate. When it is not possible to achieve full cooperation, I examine how welfare can be improved over the outcome in which no players cooperate. When conditions are such that less-patient players choose not to cooperate, I first examine how separation by action within a single market can increase welfare for all players over the uncooperative equilibrium, with more-patient players choosing to cooperate in hopes of forming a cooperative relationship, despite the risk of being matched with a less-patient player who chooses not to cooperate. I then examine how full separation of the more- and less-patient players, made possible by introduction of a second market, can increase the welfare of the more-patient players without harming the less-patient players. In a third chapter, customers choose to purchase a good from one of several competing firms in a setting in which network congestion and firms' investment in capacity plays an important role in firm costs and product quality, e.g., the wireless industry. Wireless carriers (e.g., Verizon) compete not only on the price of their service but also on its quality. The quality of a carrier's service is determined in part by the quantity of customers it serves and by investment in capacity with which to serve them. While the primary effect of a carrier increasing its capacity is an increase in that carrier's service quality, there are also externality effects on other wireless carriers. For example, if carrier A increases its capacity, thereby increasing its service quality, and causes some customers to leave a competing carrier B, the service quality experienced by customers who remain with carrier B will increase as a result of the decreased congestion in carrier B's network. This chapter examines the interplay between these effects alongside traditional price competition in this oligopoly setting.Item Essays on externalities and international cooperation : a game theoretic approach(2015-05) Klis, Anna Alexandra; Stinchcombe, Maxwell; Wiseman, Thomas E; Stahl, Dale O; Ryan, Stephen P; Moser, Scott JIn this dissertation, I present three essays which examine questions in the field of public economics using a game theoretic approach, and I derive hopeful results and helpful rules for international negotiation. In my first chapter, I examine minimum participation constraints. In the presence of heterogeneity, a minimum participation (MP) clause in a public goods arrangement can serve as a device to create a more homogeneous group. When coalitions are restricted in what they can bargain over, exclusion of some agents from the bargaining process can be Pareto improving. This paper gives a general set of sufficient conditions for such an exclusion result to hold, and presents examples of when exclusion does, and does not, improve upon unanimity. In the second chapter, I discuss the problem of determining which externality situations merit international cooperation. I create a general framework of linearized parameters to examine a general externality problem, and then I provide the sufficient conditions for a parameter to move non-cooperative and cooperative solutions in opposite directions under certain circumstances. I argue that situations which behave in this manner and which have a higher parameter value have more benefit to cooperation through the increased range in actions to bargain over. The third chapter extends upon the second chapter and applies the framework developed to an externality problem. I present a particular story of correlation in fish growth and a corresponding model which gives an example of an increasing action gap. I describe the method of use of the framework, and using the linearized parameters developed in the second chapter, I attempt to show the divergence of non-cooperative and cooperative actions in this setting, demonstrating the need for negotiation among sovereign entities.Item Essays on firm strategies and consumer dynamics in socially embedded technology networks(2013-05) Mukherjee, Rajiv, active 2013; Barua, AniteshIt is of deep interest to researchers and practitioners in Information System (IS) to understand the efficacy of the traditional IS and economics theory in modern business environments such as online social networks. In the pursuit to understand such new IS phenomenon and address the gap in extant literature, my dissertation, identifies the strategies that the firms should incorporate in the presence of network effects; i.e., the increases in benefits accrued by a network user with an increase in the number of users, and its impact on consumer behavior. My first essay, challenges the traditional notion that network effects create a strong protective moat for the incumbent in network competition. I show that network effects are over rated in multi-homing setting, where users can co-exist across multiple networks under resource constraints. Over reliance on the strength of network effects by the incumbent firm in multi-homing setting, stems from extant economic theory that is applicable to single homing networks, where users has to choose one of the available networks. The first essay recommends strategies for the level of innovation and its time of delivery that firms should incorporate in order to survive and succeed in multi-homing environment. While the first essay focuses on multi-homing and the strength of network effects, the second essay revisits firm's preemption strategy in single homing setting with network effects, in order to prevent its users from migrating to a new entrant with better technology. I find that, for moderate levels of price and innovation competition, an incumbent with high reputation is better off being non-committal in its preemption. In contrast, committal preemption is apt for other combinations of reputation, innovation and price. While the first two essays focus on the impact of consumer behavior on firm strategies, the third essay delves into the impact of firm strategies on consumer behavior. In particular, I identify identity revelation policies that increase the number of successful transactions and collaborations in a socially embedded marketplace. The results imply that revealing social identities may be detrimental to negotiation and collaboration in a socially embedded marketplace -- a notion that is counter intuitive to networks that are inherently social.Item Essays on political competition(2013-05) Roeder, Oliver Kelly; Wiseman, Thomas E., 1974-The three branches of American government---judicial, legislative, and executive---serve important governmental roles, and present their own interesting political questions. We answer three here. First, what are the differences between judges and politicians, and how does this inform the formers' selection? Second, how do senators behave to satisfy their political preferences and the electorate's? Third, what is the optimal strategy for a candidate in the Electoral College? American states select judges in various ways. In Chapter 1, we analyze "merit selection." Typically, a nonpartisan commission culls applicants for judgeships, and an appointee is selected by the governor. Then, periodically, this judge undergoes a retention election: an up-or-down vote by the state's electorate. We contribute a microeconomic model to analyze these elections. We compare this institution, in welfare terms, to others used to appoint and retain judges. Finally, we analyze a recent and ongoing phenomenon: these elections are transforming from historically rubber stamp formalities into contested, politicized contests. The politicization of issues brought before courts increases the likelihood of judges being ousted. In Chapter 2, we explore the behavior of legislators in the U.S. Senate, and of the voters who elect them. We examine shifts in incumbent senators' espoused political positions over time, as the reelection campaign approaches. We introduce novel game theoretic models of incumbent-challenger interaction. We find, through empirical analysis of senators' roll call votes, that senators moderate their positions over time, as potential reelection approaches. Moreover, this moderation accelerates. This is explained by the behavior of voters: the moderation is mirrored by the attention paid by voters. Also, the identity of an incumbent's challenger plays an important role in the amount of moderation exhibited by the incumbent. In Chapter 3, we consider a highly adaptable game theoretic model of competition in the Electoral College. It takes the form of a repeated game. Candidates make allocation decisions to persuade voters. Candidates get utility from winning office, and disutility from expending resources. We characterize optimal campaign strategy, and present comparative statics. We show, inter alia, that a candidate with an inherent advantage may prefer a longer campaign.Item A game theoretic approach to nuclear safeguards selection and optimization(2013-08) Ward, Rebecca Morgan; Schneider, Erich A.This work presents a computational tool that calculates optimally efficient safeguarding strategies at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspector seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The tool employs a novel methodology coupling a game theoretic solver with a probabilistic simulation model of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant and an aqueous reprocessing facility. The simulation model features a suite of defender options at both facilities, based on current IAEA practices, and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation model informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair and weighting the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained to generate a scenario payoff. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until the equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection strategy, proliferation strategy, and the equilibrium scenario payoff. Two types of attackers are modeled: a breakout-willing attacker, whose behavior is driven by desire for high value material; and a risk-averse attacker, who desires high-value material but will not pursue a breakout strategy that leads to certain detection. Results are presented demonstrating the sensitivity of defender strategy to budget and attacker characteristics, for an attacker known to be targeting the enrichment or reprocessing facility alone, as well as an attacker who might target either facility. The model results indicate that the optimal defender resource allocation strategy across multiple facilities hardens both facilities equitably, such that both facilities are equally unattractive targets to the attacker.Item Game-theoretic equilibrium analysis applications to deregulated electricity markets(2008-08) Joung, Manho, 1972-; Baldrick, RossThis dissertation examines game-theoretic equilibrium analysis applications to deregulated electricity markets. In particular, three specific applications are discussed: analyzing the competitive effects of ownership of financial transmission rights, developing a dynamic game model considering the ramp rate constraints of generators, and analyzing strategic behavior in electricity capacity markets. In the financial transmission right application, an investigation is made of how generators’ ownership of financial transmission rights may influence the effects of the transmission lines on competition. In the second application, the ramp rate constraints of generators are explicitly modeled using a dynamic game framework, and the equilibrium is characterized as the Markov perfect equilibrium. Finally, the strategic behavior of market participants in electricity capacity markets is analyzed and it is shown that the market participants may exaggerate their available capacity in a Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that the more conservative the independent system operator’s capacity procurement, the higher the risk of exaggerated capacity offers.Item Improvements and extensions of dynamic traffic assignment in transportation planning(2013-05) Melson, Christopher Lucas; Boyles, Stephen David, 1982-A comprehensive approach is conducted to better utilize dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) in transportation planning by investigating its role in: (1) high-order functions, (2) project evaluation, and (3) traffic assignment. A method is proposed to integrate DTA and the four-step planning model such that traffic assignment is conducted at the subnetwork level while the feedback process occurs at the regional level. By allowing interaction between the subnetwork and regional area, the method is shown to be more beneficial than previous integration structures. Additionally, DTA is applied to a case study involving the proposed urban rail system in Austin, TX. The case study showcases the benefits and capabilities of DTA when analyzing traffic impacts caused by transit rail facilities. Multiple equilibria are shown to arise in simulation-based DTA models due to simplified fundamental diagrams. Piecewise linear diagrams are introduced to eliminate unlikely equilibria. Game theory is also applied to DTA; it is shown that an equilibrium solution is guaranteed to exist for general networks in mixed strategies, and unrealistic equilibria are reduced using the trembling hand refinement.Item Issues in operations management and marketing interface research : competition, product line design, and channel coordination(2010-05) Chen, Liwen, 1974-; Gilbert, Stephen M.; Gutierrez, Genaro J.; Balakrishnan, Anant; Feng, Qi; Xia, YusenThis dissertation studies important issues in supply chain management and marketing interface research: competition, product line design, and channel efficiency, at the presence of vertically differentiated products. Vertical differentiation as a means of price discrimination has been well-studied in both economics and marketing literature. However, less attention has been paid on how vertical differentiation has been operationalized. In this dissertation, we focus our study on two types of vertical differentiation: the one created by a product line which is produced by the same firm, and the one created by products from different firms. We especially are interested in the so-called private label products vs. the national brand products. Specifically, this dissertation explores how vertical differentiation can affect the interactions among the members of a supply chain in several different contexts. In the first piece of work, we use a game theoretic model to explore how the ability of a retailer to introduce a private label product affects its interaction with a manufacturer of a national brand. In the second essay, we are investigating how an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) will be affected by the entry of a competitor when there are strategic suppliers of a critical component. If these suppliers behave strategically, it is not clear that the entry of other players will necessarily be harmful to the incumbent. In the last work, we pay our attention to an emerging change happening in the industry: some retailers begin to sell their private labels through their competitors. We investigate the strategic role of a retailer selling her own private label products through another retailer. In summary, this dissertation illustrates how vertical differentiation play a crucial role in firms' supply chain as well as marketing strategies. Therefore, it is important for firms to recognize these strategic issues related to vertically differentiated products while making operations/marketing decisions.Item Pricing implications of self-control dynamics(2015-08) Schaefer, Richard Paul; Mahajan, Vijay, 1948-; Rao, Raghunath Singh; Henderson, Ty; Sonnier, Garrett; Wiseman, ThomasSelf-control failure can arise as a result of numerous reasons; however, existing models of self-control largely overlook many of these causes. My dissertation examines two such sources of self-control failure in a buyer-seller framework. In turn, I generate new marketing insights for product categories affected by consumers' self-control limitations. My first essay examines instances in which a resolution seeker becomes demotivated after a minor lapse or slip-up. To examine this issue, I utilize a self-signaling model that accounts for the complex process in which a consumer manages his self-control perceptions during a long-term resolution. Specifically, I employ a model wherein a consumer oscillates between long-term resolution planning and short-term implementation: during each implementation juncture, the consumer must determine whether to lapse or follow through with prior resolution plans, a decision that affects his self-control perceptions in subsequent periods of long-term resolution planning. Using this framework, I derive many significant marketing insights for self-improvement programs, products which assist the pursuit of long-term resolutions. I first determine when a profit-maximizing seller prefers revenue collection through upfront fees vis-à-vis per-usage fees. I also establish when self-signaling, as a process to manage self-control perceptions, leads to higher per-usage rates. In addition, I examine the product quality implications of self-signaling and find that, under certain cost conditions, a joint product and pricing strategy reduces the likelihood of program use. Finally, I analyze the use of variable per-usage fees, determining how introductory and loyalty discounts influence self-control perceptions over time. My second essay considers the short-term psychological fatigue which results from the exercise of self-control. I utilize a model in which a consumer's cost of resisting temptation depends on his prior decisions: if he previously exercised self-control, his mental fatigue necessitates that he exert greater effort to resist temptation again. I then employ this framework to investigate a firm's sales promotion strategy when selling a product that offers immediate gratification. I determine the circumstances in which the seller offers a short-term price promotion and, when offered, how the seller times its sale with respect to fatigue.Item Raising the BAR in dependable cooperative services(2013-08) Wong, Edmund Liangfei; Alvisi, LorenzoCooperative services--a term which includes any system that relies on the resources and participation of its clients to function--have proven to be a popular, naturally scalable means to disseminate content, distribute computational workloads, or provide network connectivity. However, because these services critically depend on participants that are not controlled by a single administrative domain, these services must be designed to function in environments where no participant--because of failure or selfishness--will necessarily follow the specified protocol. This thesis addresses the challenge of establishing and maintaining cooperation in cooperative services by (1) advancing our understanding of the limits to what our services can guarantee in the presence of failure, (2) demonstrating the critical role that correct participants can play in the incentives provided by the service, and (3) proposing a new notion of equilibrium that, unlike traditional notions, provides both rigorous yet practical guarantees in the presence of collusion. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our ideas can be applied to practice by designing and implementing Seer, a system that provides a scalable, reliable, and robust method for disseminating content even if participants may fail arbitrarily or deviate selfishly as a coalition.