Browsing by Subject "Ethics."
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Item Divine choice and natural law : the eudokian ethics of Francis Turretin.(2008-10-14T15:19:28Z) Bruce, James Elliot, 1974-; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Francis Turretin (1623–1687) places a threefold scheme of right (ius) within the framework of Thomistic natural law to explain the relationship between the divine will and the moral order. He centers his inquiry on a single question: can God ever dispense with a precept of the moral law? That is, can God temporarily suspend the obligation that a person has to a moral law so that an individual action is not immoral, even though it would be otherwise, if it were not for God’s command? For Turretin, the answer is unequivocally in the negative: God cannot dispense with any of the precepts of the moral law at any time, for any reason. Nevertheless, some laws do change, and Turretin uses divine, natural, and positive rights to explain why this change is possible. Divine right describes the authority and privilege, as well as the duties and obligations, that God has on account of his own nature. Natural right describes those privileges and obligations that God has due to the nature of the things he has chosen to create, and positive right deals with those additional privileges and obligations that arise from divine choice alone. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from divine and natural right cannot change. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from positive right can change, however. That God cannot change the moral law, or even dispense with it, does not undermine his freedom, because God is internally, and not externally, constrained. In his free choosing, from his eudokia (good pleasure), God is constrained by divine right, from his own nature; by natural right, from the nature of the things he has made; and, by positive right, from whatever additional laws he has chosen to establish. God’s free choice cannot contravene the natural law, yet the natural law is determined by God’s free choice, in so far as the natural law is constituted by the nature of the things God has chosen to create.Item The legitimacy of the comic : Kierkegaard and the importance of the comic for his ethics and theology.(2011-12-19) Williams, Will (George Willis); Martens, Paul Henry.; Religion.; Baylor University. Dept. of Religion.While some consider the comic to be a trivial subject, fit mainly for amusement or distraction, Søren Kierkegaard disagrees. This dissertation examines Kierkegaard’s understanding of the nature of the comic and how he believes even the triviality of comic jest to be deeply tied to ethical and theological earnestness. First, I examine Kierkegaard’s understanding of the comic, irony, and humor, drawing primarily from Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). I argue that, for Kierkegaard, the comic is a contradiction or misrelation that is essentially though not absolutely painless, providing a “way out.” The comic is a contradiction between norms, suggesting that it springs from one’s perspective in a way that holds important implications for one’s ethical and theological worldview. Kierkegaard believes that subjective development is closely tied to one’s capacity to perceive the comic, making the comic both diagnostic of and formative for one’s subjective state. For him, the Christian is far from humorless, instead having the maximum human capacity to perceive the comic. Next, I show that the previously argued conception of the comic can be found in other works by Kierkegaard: Prefaces (1844), Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (1847), and the Corsair affair (c.1845-1848). Then, I examine representatives of the Deconstructionist tradition of reading Kierkegaard, namely Louis Mackey, Roger Poole, Elsebet Jegstrup, and Mark C. Taylor. I argue that, while they accurately perceive the widespread irony in Kierkegaard’s corpus, they incorrectly conclude that such irony is a sign of his lack of earnest interest in philosophy and theology. Their conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of what Kierkegaard believes the nature of irony to be. Finally, I consider two contemporary representatives of the tradition of reading Kierkegaard theologically, namely Murray Rae and W. Glenn Kirkconnell. I argue that, while their instincts regarding Kierkegaard are generally preferable to those of the Deconstructionist tradition, they lack the latter’s awareness of Kierkegaard’s use of the comic and willingness to let it influence their conclusions. Their already significant arguments would, I suggest, be strengthened and extended with an increased appreciation for the legitimate function that Kierkegaard believes the comic to play for ethics and theology.Item Moral particularism, aquinas, and the problem of context-dependence : a formal solution to a material puzzle.(2014-09-05) Echelbarger, David T.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Davis, Darin Harris, 1969-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This dissertation is a historically informed response to what I call the problem of context-dependence. The problem of context-dependence is a problem for moral philosophy that stems from the fact that the rightness or wrongness of an action seems to be dependent upon the context in which it occurs. Moral particularists, such as Jonathan Dancy, use he context-dependence of rightness and wrongness to cast doubt upon our ability to formulate universally true moral principles. I contend that this is troublesome because if it is true that moral principles might not apply to all cases, then worries arise about our ability to understand and rationally navigate the moral domain. In response to this concern, I argue that it is possible to solve the problem of context-dependence by retrieving a neglected understanding of the structure of morality from Thomas Aquinas—namely his view that each instance of right and wrong is a composite of formal and material elements. I maintain that this distinction allows Aquinas to embrace the variability of right and wrong acts at the material level, while maintaining that all right actions share the same general form. In turn, the notion that right and wrong actions are made right by intelligible universal forms restores confidence in our ability to articulate and defend moral principles.Item Neo-Kantian wickedness : constructivist and realist responses to moral skepticism.(2013-09-16) Giannini, Heidi Chamberlin.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first chapter, this strong response to moral skepticism renders deliberate immoral action unintelligible. This result is problematic since we often do interpret ourselves and others as deliberately choosing to do wrong. I further suggest that this problem follows from central commitments of Korsgaard’s constructivism, so that any adequate account of immoral action must abandon constructivist metaethics in favor of moral realism, a suggestion reinforced by the argument of my second chapter. There, I call attention to Kant’s solution to a similar problem in his own account of morality. I argue that Korsgaard’s constructivist commitments prevent her from embracing Kant’s solution. I proceed in my third chapter to argue that there is a further tension between Korsgaard’s response to moral skepticism and her work in non-ideal theory. In particular, Korsgaard maintains that, when confronted with injustice, the virtuous person may have reason to do what is wrong in the name of morality. She thus relies on the assumption that one can deliberately do wrong. I argue that this assumption undermines the response to skepticism that motivated Korsgaard’s constructivism in the first place. But despite the problems with constructivism, we may worry that moral realism fails to offer an adequate response to moral skepticism. Indeed, Korsgaard rejects realism in part because she believes that realists simply refuse to respond to moral skepticism. I thus conclude by arguing that moral realists can offer adequate responses to moral skepticism. In fact, I believe Korsgaard’s response is no more effective than those suggested by some moral realists.Item Toward a richer account of human rights in Christian moral theory : from Wolterstorff and Hauerwas to Wojtyla.(2012-08-08) Schwartz, Joel Aric.; Kruschwitz, Robert B.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The role of human rights is disputed in Christian moral theory. When human rights are discussed, it is common to find that a problematic understanding of the human agent is assumed in those discussions, one that understands the agent motivated strictly by belief and accompanying desires. This connection is reflected in the work of Christian thinkers Nicholas Wolterstorff and Stanley Hauerwas. While they take opposing views of the value of human rights in Christian moral theory, both see a connection between this understanding of the human agent and human rights. An alternate understanding of the human agent focuses on developing perceptions and proper valuation of the good. Karol Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul II, expresses an understanding of human dignity and perfectionism in his personalism that results in this alternate understanding of the human agent. When using this different understanding of the human agent, we can discover a richer account of human rights, an account that encourages us not only to do actions that typically reflect a respect for the dignity of human persons, but to actually cultivate appreciation for that dignity. Two oft-‐neglect characteristics of human rights are highlighted in the final chapter: a Wojtylian principle of correlatives and a commitment to completion of the human person, which are suggested by the perfectionism in Wojtyla’s personalism. Both of these characteristics of human rights reflect this alternate understanding of human agency, moving us toward both perceiving and valuing the human dignity in ourselves and one another in a meaningful way.Item Tragic philosophy and human desire : bringing Nietzsche and Plato into conversation with contemporary ethics.(2013-05-15) Coblentz, William Travis.; Schultz, Anne-Marie, 1966-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.In his Retrieval of Ethics, Talbot Brewer complains of a fundamentally inadequate moral psychology within contemporary ethics, most importantly the limitation of human desire to the instrumental. In response, Brewer, drawing primarily from Aristotle, develops an account of human desire that finds fulfillment-without-ceasing within “dialectical” activity, that is, activity that has an object irreducible to a propositionally describable state of affairs. In this work, I pursue interpretations of Nietzsche and Plato, arguing that they both practice tragic philosophies, implying in turn that that they both held that fundamental human desire can be fulfilled only in dialectical activity. In chapters two through four, I trace Nietzsche’s development from a metaphysical description of tragedy to the practice of tragic philosophy that rejects any metaphysics from which one may derive a telos or morality. This allows a fulfillment of human desire in the constant failure of knowledge to grant the state of affairs necessary to fulfill desires-that is, disappointment. And out of disappointment, one may fulfill-without-ceasing the will to power in ever new forms of creation, thus affirming the activity that is life. Chapters five through seven offer an interpretation of Plato, in which he presents a Socrates who practices an erotic and tragic philosophy that shows a complementary relationship between the aporetic and constructive dialogues. Socrates’ ironic claim to ignorance expresses both the human inability to acquire knowledge of metaphysics and the possibility of the practice of dialectic to bring one into the presence of the Good/Beauty. Socrates’ practice of philosophy is both tragic and erotic, in that it expresses constant striving without the claiming of its goal (lack), and yet achieves the fulfillment-without-ceasing that can be the only “object” of eros. Both Nietzsche and Plato expose a rich view of human desire, fulfilled only in dialectical activity. Their tragic philosophies reflect their views of desire, and so offer resources for contemporary ethics both in terms of philosophical method and more adequate accounts of human desire. In terms of fullness and lack, an important distinction arises between eros and the will to power that may encourage further discussion.Item Unprincipled moral learning : Dewey's pragmatism and Dancy's particularism.(2014-06-11) Jackson, Nathan E.; Rosenbaum, Stuart E.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This dissertation draws on resources in John Dewey's work to respond to a lacuna in Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism. Dancy maintains that there are few, if any, true universal moral principles, and that moral reasoning and judgment do not depend upon them. He holds that moral justification is narrative, and affirms a view of moral competence where an individual is able to track a situation’s salient features in their particular relationships, what he calls a situation’s "shape." However, it is unclear how moral education is possible on a particularist framework, and I argue in chapter two that the resources Dancy offers here are inadequate. Moreover, since different situations will contain different salient features and exhibit different shapes, Dancy's particularism faces a problem regarding the use of imaginary cases in moral education and reasoning. Since the same feature can be salient in different ways from one situation to another, the best cases can do is to yield "reminders" of the importance that a feature can have. In response, I argue that John Dewey's work on habits, tradition, and imagination can provide avenues of response for particularism. In chapter 3, I respond to the criticism that Dancy and Dewey's views are incompatible, since Dewey eschews claims to objectivity. I show that Dancy's conception of objectivity, "Hegelian objectivity," shares fundamental commitments with Dewey's conceptions of inquiry and criticism. Afterwards, in chapter 4, I argue that Dewey can explain the possibility of particularist moral education as enculturation into a "culture of evaluation" in terms of habituation in traditions. For Dewey, habits are projective demands for activity that organize experienced elements, or features of situations. By performing conjoint activities in a social environment, one forms habits that explain the salience of certain features. Finally, in chapter 5, I argue that Dewey's work on imagination in his aesthetic work helps answer the challenge regarding cases. In interacting with a case, one is not necessarily looking for new properties. Instead, cases can alter the background understanding one brings to a situation. Cases can argue for the potential of certain narrative elements, like particular metaphors, to enable coherent descriptions of situations.Item Virtues, divine commands, and the debt of creation: towards a Kierkegaardian Christian ethic.(Southwestern Philosophical Society, 2006-01) Manis, R. Zachary (Robert Zachary).; Evans, C. Stephen.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Though Kierkegaard's ethic in "Works of Love" frequently has been a target of harsh — and often uncharitable — criticism, a number of recent treatments have sought to defend both its viability and its relevance to the contemporary discussion. Increasingly, the literature is replete with interpretations that situate it within the traditions of virtue ethics and/or divine command theory. I evaluate these readings, focusing primarily on the issue of moral obligation in Kierkegaard's writings. I argue that both the virtue and divine command interpretations are deficient, though Kierkegaard's ethic indeed shares significant points of contact with both traditions. I explicate and defend an alternative account of moral obligation that seems to me most to warrant the label, "Kierkegaardian," and attempt to expand the view, taking Kierkegaard's ethic as a foundation upon which to build a theoretically rigorous account of moral obligation. The resulting view, I argue, captures the best of both virtue ethics and divine command theory, while avoiding the most serious problems of each.Item Without measure : Marion’s apophatic-virtue phenomenology of iconic love.(2010-02-02T19:46:41Z) Antoninka, Amy.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.I investigate Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love and its relation to ethics. I argue that his phenomenology of love provides a possibility for developing ethics. I rely on the saturated phenomenon of the icon and his phenomenology of love. I establish that the icon provides a rich sense of relation, a need to modify certain appraisals of justice, and provides a descriptive account of the virtue of receptivity. In chapter one, I give an exegesis of Marion's phenomenology of the icon. He argues that the icon moves toward charity, yet does not relate to ethics. Experience of the icon gives transformed vision that voids universal laws and frees the beholder to experience communion. In chapter two, I provide three examples of iconic experience that emphasize the importance of justice for the icon in contrast to Marion's formulation that justice is equivalent to revenge. I argue that Marion attacks justice because of its link to a deontological definition; yet, freed from deontology, Marion makes room for an apophatic way that moves toward a virtue ethic. In chapter three, I look at Marion's reasons for leaving ethics out of the icon. His critique of Kantian ethics, as well as his use and critique of the Levinas suggest that he opposes modern metaphysical ethics. In discussion of the receptivity to the call of the Other, he relies on the virtues. This reliance shows that Marion has room for a descriptive account of ethics, and that ignoring ethics undermines his overall project. I investigate Marion's claim that the icon opens up to charity by reading the apophatic doctrine of the icon in concert with the erotic reduction. I conclude that Marion’s phenomenology can be viewed as a counter-ethics a way to see phenomenology as a virtue practice, to unify reason and love in ethics, to remove the ego from the central concern of ethics, and to see the need for openness and vulnerability to the iconic other.