Browsing by Subject "Epistemology."
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Item Justified closure of inquiry : a non-reductive account.(2014-06-11) Martin, Kraig W.; Kvanvig, Jonathan L.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This dissertation is concerned with answering the following question: In virtue of what is one justified in closing inquiry? A closure of inquiry in an act whereby one intentionally stops some investigation and does so with the intention of not investigating in the future. I argue that on a maximization model of practical rationality, one is fully justified to close inquiry whenever one is morally obligated to close inquiry, or one is practically and morally justified in closing inquiry, or one is morally and evidentially justified in closing inquiry and one is justified in believing that closing inquiry is as good as any other means to the achievement of one’s ends (perhaps because one is justifiably worried that any defeaters one finds will be misleading defeaters). On a model of practical rationality in which an act is practically rational for one only if one is justified in believing that the act is as good as any other means toward the achievement of one’s ends, then one is fully justified in closing inquiry whenever one is morally obligated to close inquiry, or one is morally and practically justified in closing inquiry.Item Knowledge revealed to the heart : an articulation and defense of Pascal's epistemology.(2011-09-14) Klapauszak, Janelle Liesl.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.It is the focus of this dissertation to articulate Pascal’s position, which may be viewed as a middle ground between skepticism and dogmatism; a position that induces the reader to seek. The second and third chapters will be devoted to Pascal’s rejections of dogmatism and skepticism. By identifying his reasons for rejecting these two views, the middle position that Pascal attempts to hold will become clear. The fourth chapter will investigate the concept of divine illumination, first in Augustine, and then as it is passed down to Descartes and Pascal. The fifth chapter will be focused on articulating Pascal’s account of the heart, which allows for what I have termed dependent certainty. Chapter six will be devoted to placing this position within the landscape of contemporary epistemology, and specifically in arguing to what extent it ought to be interpreted as a kind of fideism and suggesting commonalities between Pascal’s eudaimonaic account and contemporary virtue epistemology.Item Theism and the justification of first principles in Thomas Reid’s epistemology.(2013-09-24) Poore, Gregory S.; Buras, Jackson Todd.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The role of theism in Thomas Reid’s epistemology remains an unresolved question. Opinions range from outright denials that theism has any relevance to Reid’s epistemology to claims that Reid’s epistemology depends upon theism in a dogmatic or a viciously circular manner. This dissertation attempts to bring some order to this interpretive fray by answering the following question: What role or roles does theism play in Reid’s epistemology, particularly in relation to the epistemic justification of first principles? Chapters 2-4 lay the foundation for answering this question and clarify some terminology. Chapter 2 distinguishes key senses in which Reid uses the terms “principle” and “first principle.” Chapter 3 argues for a novel interpretation of common sense and the principles of common sense. This interpretation avoids a number of objections to Reid’s principles of common sense. Chapter 4 considers the initial externalist justification of Reid’s first principles. It shows Reid has a surprisingly well-developed proper-functionalism and brings to light several overlooked elements of his epistemology. Chapters 5-8 argue theism can and does play various important and philosophically respectable roles in Reid’s epistemology, particularly in relation to the justification of first principles. Chapter 5 argues that even on the standard foundationalist interpretation of Reid’s epistemology, theism can and does boost the justification of first principles. Chapter 6 shows Reid’s epistemology is not a form of simple foundationalism but contains coherentist elements. This enables theism further to boost the justification of first principles. Chapter 7 reveals that Reid’s epistemology contains different kinds or levels of knowledge, and shows that theism enables the highest form of knowledge, which I call scientia. Chapter 8 argues that within Reid’s epistemology theism helps protect and preserve the justification of first principles.