Browsing by Subject "Electricity markets"
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Item Analyzing strategic behaviors in electricity markets via transmission-constrained residual demand(2009-12) Xu, Lin; Baldick, RossThis dissertation studies how to characterize strategic behaviors in electricity markets from a transmission-constrained residual demand perspective. This dissertation generalizes the residual demand concept, widely used by economists in general markets, to electricity markets, which are constrained by transmission networks. The transmission-constrained residual demand is characterized by a sensitivity analysis of the optimal power flow program, which is the electricity market clearing engine. Methods are proposed to optimize a generator or generation firm's profit utilizing the residual demand sensitivity information, which has several advantages over existing methods. The transmission-constrained residual demand concept and the methods are helpful for market participants to develop bidding strategies and for market monitors to analyze market power in electricity markets.Item Autonomous trading in modern electricity markets(2015-12) Urieli, Daniel; Stone, Peter, 1971-; Mooney, Raymond; Ravikumar, Pradeep; Baldick, Ross; Kolter, ZicoThe smart grid is an electricity grid augmented with digital technologies that automate the management of electricity delivery. The smart grid is envisioned to be a main enabler of sustainable, clean, efficient, reliable, and secure energy supply. One of the milestones in the smart grid vision will be programs for customers to participate in electricity markets through demand-side management and distributed generation; electricity markets will (directly or indirectly) incentivize customers to adapt their demand to supply conditions, which in turn will help to utilize intermittent energy resources such as from solar and wind, and to reduce peak-demand. Since wholesale electricity markets are not designed for individual participation, retail brokers could represent customer populations in the wholesale market, and make profit while contributing to the electricity grid’s stability and reducing customer costs. A retail broker will need to operate continually and make real-time decisions in a complex, dynamic environment. Therefore, it will benefit from employing an autonomous broker agent. With this motivation in mind, this dissertation makes five main contributions to the areas of artificial intelligence, smart grids, and electricity markets. First, this dissertation formalizes the problem of autonomous trading by a retail broker in modern electricity markets. Since the trading problem is intractable to solve exactly, this formalization provides a guideline for approximate solutions. Second, this dissertation introduces a general algorithm for autonomous trading in modern electricity markets, named LATTE (Lookahead-policy for Autonomous Time-constrained Trading of Electricity). LATTE is a general framework that can be instantiated in different ways that tailor it to specific setups. Third, this dissertation contributes fully implemented and operational autonomous broker agents, each using a different instantiation of LATTE. These agents were successful in international competitions and controlled experiments and can serve as benchmarks for future research in this domain. Detailed descriptions of the agents’ behaviors as well as their source code are included in this dissertation. Fourth, this dissertation contributes extensive empirical analysis which validates the effectiveness of LATTE in different competition levels under a variety of environmental conditions, shedding light on the main reasons for its success by examining the importance of its constituent components. Fifth, this dissertation examines the impact of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs in competitive electricity markets through empirical analysis. Time-Of-Use tariffs are proposed for demand-side management both in the literature and in the real-world. The success of the different instantiations of LATTE demonstrates its generality in the context of electricity markets. Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates that an autonomous broker can act effectively in modern electricity markets by executing an efficient lookahead policy that optimizes its predicted utility, and by doing so the broker can benefit itself, its customers, and the economy.Item Improving electricity market efficiency : from market monitoring to reserve allocation(2012-05) Lee, Yen-Yu, 1984-; Baldick, Ross; Grady, Mack; Kwasinski, Alexis; Morton, David P.; Obadina, Diran; Wood, KevinThis dissertation proposes new methods to improve the efficiency of electricity markets with respect to market monitoring and reserve allocation. We first present new approaches to monitor the level of competition in electricity markets, a critical task for helping the markets function smoothly. The proposed approaches are based on economic principles and a faithful representation of transmission constraints. The effectiveness of the new approaches is demonstrated by examples based on medium- and large-scale electric power systems. We then propose a new system-operation model using stochastic optimization to systematically allocate reserves under uncertainty. This model aims to overcome the difficulties in both system and market operations caused by the integration of wind power, which results in a higher degree of supply uncertainty. The numerical examples suggest that the proposed model significantly lower the operation costs, especially under high levels of wind penetration.Item Strategic behavior analysis in electricity markets(2003-05) Son, You Seok; Baldick, RossStrategic behaviors in electricity markets are analyzed. Three related topics are investigated. The first topic is a research about the NE search algorithm for complex non-cooperative games in electricity markets with transmission constraints. Hybrid co-evolutionary programming is suggested and simulated for complex examples. The second topic is an analysis about the competing pricing mechanisms of uniform and pay-as-bid pricing in an electricity market. We prove that for a two-player static game the Nash Equilibrium under pay-as-bid pricing will yield less total revenue in expectation than under uniform pricing when demand is inelastic. The third topic is to address a market power mitigation issue of the current Texas electricity market by limiting Transmission Congestion Right (TCR) ownership. The strategic coordination of inter zonal scheduling and balancing market manipulation is analyzed. A market power measurement algorithm useful to determine the proper level of TCR ownership limitation is suggested.