Browsing by Subject "Corruption"
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Item International Entry Decision for Design Firms(2013-11-22) Tohidi Vahdat, AminInternational projects within the Architecture-Engineering-Construction (AEC) sector have increased both in number and in revenue during the past two decades. AEC companies seek projects outside of their home country at much higher rates than the past and the decision to enter into a new market is one of the most critical decisions AEC companies face in often volatile and competitive environments. There are few studies that investigate the important factors influencing international entry into a new market. This dissertation developed a model investigating the influence of two company specific factors, international experience and embeddedness, and two country institutions, legal system and corruption, on the entry in a new international market using event history analysis. The focus of this study is to analyze the entry decision making for firms that are working in the Architecture and Engineering sector of the construction industry. In this dissertation these companies are classified as Design Firms. The logit regression model was developed to understand the influence of four dependent variables on the entry decision of design firms. The model controls for GDP per capita, market competition, and diversification level of companies. The analysis was based on the longitudinal data from international design firms entering in the Central Eastern European countries since 1991 when the Soviet Union sphere of influence waned. The results of this study contribute to the body of knowledge by introducing a quantitative model that investigates the influence of company and country factors on the international entry of design firms. Practitioners can use the results of this study in their entry decision-making. The results may also help practitioners identify and collect important information and knowledge as they pursue international projects.Item La Corruption dans les romans de Balzac: une étude des personnages, des institutions et des mœurs(2013-05) Latimer, Stacey C; Bains, Christopher; Edwards, Carole; Price, JosephLa corruption chez Balzac se focalise sur l’intrigue au sens plein du terme et sur les motivations des personnages, des institutions et de la société. A travers les œuvres de La Comédie humaine, Balzac conçoit sa propre société avec Paris comme le cadre d’une mise en scène. Le lien entre les œuvres crée la possibilité de l’observation de la corruption dans le développement des personnages et des intrigues. L’effet de cette corruption se manifeste de diverses manières et traverse toutes les classes sociales. Génie descriptif, Balzac laisse infiltrer la corruption dans les détails de ce monde parisien selon sa vision réaliste. La vision de la corruption de Balzac est essentiellement que personne n’évite la corruption et que la corruption soit inévitable dans la société et chez les gens. Dans la vision de corruption de La Comédie humaine, on voit clairement que chaque œuvre, chaque personnage, chaque circonstance et chaque détail expriment la vue unique de l’artiste chez l’écrivain. Ainsi, le lecteur peut voir ce monde corrupteur et monstrueux de Paris à travers les descriptions de Balzac. L’objectif de cette étude est de montrer que la corruption dans La Comédie humaine est inévitable et puissante et que la corruption influence chaque détail et chaque personnage.Item The non-commercial objectives of national oil companies(2015-12) McGroary, Lin; Dzienkowski, John S., 1959-; Spence, David B; Taylor, Melinda ENational oil companies (NOCs) play an important role in the international oil and gas industry; collectively NOCs control approximately 90% of worldwide oil reserves. NOC are either wholly or partially owned by their country’s government, and as such can be used as a tool to meet the government’s aims. An NOC can maximize profits, which maximizes revenues to the government, or the government can use the NOC to fulfill its non-commercial goals. This paper focuses on how non-commercial goals affect profitability and make a national oil company more susceptible to corruption. I argue that NOCs that follow non-commercial goals are less likely to be successful commercially; however there are different non-commercial goals that affect commerciality differently. NOCs that follow specific non-commercial goals, such as economic development, are also more susceptible to corruption, this is because these goals lend themselves to governments that are trying to establish political legitimacy. I look at case studies of six different countries (Saudi Arabia, China, Norway, Venezuela, Nigeria and Russia), and their associated NOCs, to establish how non-commercial goals affect the NOCs. Other factors also affect the commerciality of NOCs; factors such as the legal framework of the country, and whether regulations are well established. I conclude by comparing the national oil companies and their non-commercial objectives and exploring the differences between the companies.Item Political ambition and Socratic philosophy : Plato's presentation of Socrates and Alcibiades(2015-05) Helfer, Ariel Oscar; Pangle, Thomas L.; Pangle, Lorraine S; Stauffer, Devin; Saxonhouse, Arlene; Ahrensdorf, PeterThis dissertation examines and interprets Plato’s three major presentations of the infamous Athenian general and Socratic pupil Alcibiades as a paragon of political ambition: the Alcibiades, the Second Alcibiades, and Plato’s Symposium. These texts are, for the first time, treated as authentic Platonic works and presumed to present a coherent though incomplete narrative of the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades. The dynamic Platonic portrait of Alcibiades’ changing disposition toward democracy, law, virtue, and piety offers insight into the corruptibility of political ambition. By studying it, we can recover a valuable classical point of view on the nature of political ambition, especially in its relation to civic-spiritedness on one hand, and to the self-serving pursuit of private or political goods on the other. This point of view can in turn be brought to bear upon our own political situation as citizens of liberal democracy, with its complex tradition of distrust of the political ambitious. Finally, the question of Socrates’ corruption of Alcibiades itself provides invaluable insight into the matter of Socrates’ own enigmatic philosophic project, which brought him into fatal conflict with the city of Athens.Item The Best Foreign Policy Money Can Buy? An Investigation of Foreign Lobbying and U.S. Foreign Policy(2010-07-14) Freeman, Benjamin J.Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.Item The effect of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) diffusion on corruption and transparency (a global study)(Texas A&M International University, 2013-06-14) Gaskins, Leebrian Ernest; Kock, Ned F.; Mayfield, Milton R.; Rivas-Chavez, Andres E; Brown, Randel D.Is the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) the “magic bullet” for effectively reducing corruption? Can government transparency be increased by ICT diffusion? Does ICT diffusion increase governmental transparency, thereby reducing corruption? A few previous studies have measured the relationship between ICTs, transparency, and corruption. Generally, such studies focus on the role of electronic governance (e-governance) in facilitating state-citizen interactions and how e-governance acts as a corruption deterrent. This study digresses from past literature by directly exploring the effects of the ICT environment, using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI), and diffusion of two specific ICTs (e.g. the number of Internet users per 100 people and mobile cellular phone users per 100 people) on corruption and transparency through structural equation modeling. This study also examines how macroeconomic and national sociocultural variables mediate and moderate the relationships of ICTs on transparency and corruption. The results show that for each increase unit in NRI, transparency increased by 9.423% and corruption decreased by 14.017%. Furthermore, increasing access to the Internet by 27 people per 100 persons increased transparency by 17.581% and reduced corruption by 15.239%. Additionally, each unit increase in per capita GDP results in an increase in transparency by 7.068% and a decrease in corruption by 10.507%. Conversely, increases in FDI and mobile cellular diffusion demonstrated marginal results on increasing transparency and reducing corruption. Implications of these findings as well as avenues for further research are discussed.Item Today’s allies, tomorrow’s enemies? The political dynamics of corruption scandals in Latin America(2011-08) Balán, Manuel Elías; Weyland, Kurt Gerhard; Elkins, Zachary; Greene, Kenneth; Hunter, Wendy; Madrid, Raúl; Przeworski, Adam; Brinks, DanielIn the last two decades, corruption has become a key concern throughout the world. Most of what we know about corruption comes from instances in which misdeeds become public, usually generating a scandal. Why do some acts of corruption become corruption scandals and others do not? This dissertation argues that scandals are not triggered by corruption per se, but are initially caused by the dynamics of political competition within the government. Government insiders leak information on misdeeds in order to increase their influence within the coalition/party in power. A powerful opposition, contrary to common beliefs, acts as a constraint for insiders, making corruption scandals less likely. In order to advance this central argument, this dissertation divides the temporal development of corruption scandals into four stages and proposes a formal model that analyzes the interactions of government insiders and the political opposition. The arguments and hypotheses generated are then evaluated using empirical evidence from two paradigmatic Latin American cases, Argentina and Chile, from 1989 to 2010. The findings support the notion that corruption scandals emerge as a consequence of political competition.