Browsing by Subject "Compensation"
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Item Caleb Strawn Sport Marketing and Management Interdisciplinary Studies Portfolio(2013-04) Strawn, Caleb; Massengale, Dana; Karam, Elizabeth P.; Fox, GavinThis master’s portfolio is comprised of three separate papers that were written at the request of the three professors on my interdisciplinary studies portfolio committee. The first paper is an expansion of a research paper written in a Sport Management class for Dr. Dana Massengale. This paper explores the possibility of the compensation of Division I student-athletes and explains the complex situation that the NCAA faces in the O’Bannon legal case. The second paper was written in a Business Management class for Dr. Liz Karam. This paper is introspective in nature and places myself in the position of a business called ‘Strawn Inc.’. This paper explores my personality traits, strengths and weakness in order to fully describe the nature of products that ‘Strawn Inc.’ produces. As the Business Marketing representative on my portfolio review committee, Dr. Fox requested that I write a paper that expressed my intentions upon enrolling in my graduate program, key themes I learned through all three of my areas of study, and what I have learned that will be valuable beyond graduation and into my career. Some major points of discovery in this paper include the importance of both the management of people and relationships as well as the management of planning and processes in sports, business and life.Item Motivating employees for long term company success(2010-12) Rutkowski, Kevin John; Lewis, Kyle, 1961-; Duvic, Robert C.There have been many recent examples in the news of how employees were motivated by their companies to take actions that were not best for the long term success of the company. Mortgage companies gave financial incentives to brokers for each loan approved regardless of quality, which resulted in a large number of defaults several years later. BP, the oil company, gave financial incentives to employees based on short-term profits, which motivated management to perform cheaper and less frequent maintenance on the Alaskan Pipeline. This led to increased bonuses until a pipeline failure several years later. And numerous financial institutions gave employees big performance bonuses based on short-term profits one year before their institutions failed. Many analysts have stated that lucrative bonuses that did not take into account long-term company performance motivated many employees to take dangerous financial risks. In addition, in my 16 years of software development consulting, I have first-hand experience with seeing how companies' motivation techniques influence people to ignore the long-term success of their company. I have seen incentives for delivering a project on time influence project managers and developers to push low quality software into production in order to meet that deadline. Similarly, I have seen incentives (for meeting budget numbers on a project) influence managers to eliminate planning and quality assurance in order to lower the cost of implementing the project. In each of those cases, the resulting low quality software caused long-term damage to the company that could have been avoided if the project were higher quality but slightly late or over budget. I have also seen that incentives, intended to encourage call center employees to take more calls per hour, ended up motivating employees to hang up on customers without solving their problems. This resulted in low customer satisfaction, which led to a long term reduction in sales. These are only a few of the many examples I have seen in my career of how the wrong motivational techniques can have unintended, negative, long-term results for a company. Regardless of whether the motivational techniques are based on profits, revenues, productivity, stock price, or some other factor, many motivational techniques include financial incentives that are based on monthly, quarterly, or yearly results without regard for longer periods of time. Long term incentives, such as vesting in a 401(k) or increased vacation time, are typically focused solely on retaining employees rather than on long-term company performance. This thesis explores the ways in which companies currently motivate employees. The motivation may be extrinsic, using tools such as financial incentives or it may be intrinsic, using tools such as company culture or hiring practices. This thesis will review both academic research and practical management experience related to employee motivation with a goal of identifying practical recommendations for improving the current, common motivational practices. These improvements should encourage employees to take the best actions for the long-term success of the company.Item Optimized multi-stage amplifier compensation method for wide load variations(2012-08) Marijanovic, Srdjan; Akinwande, Deji; Ranjbar, MohammadDue to variations in process, voltage, and temperature (PVT), amplifiers are almost solely designed for use in a negative feedback loop. The feedback loop mitigates the effect of PVT, however maintaining stability becomes the main design challenge. Further, multi-stage amplifiers with high open-loop gain are used for powering headphone speakers in modern portable electronics. As there are many different headphone manufacturers and compatibility specifications, headphone amplifiers are subjected to a wide variation in capacitive and resistive loads, which further complicates the stability upkeep. This thesis explores a two-stage (Common-Gate Feedback) and three-stage (Impedance Adapting Compensation) amplifier topology with respect to performance under wide load variations. For both compensation topologies, an analytical analysis is presented, followed by a design proposal for a headphone amplifier application. Finally, the trade-offs for maintaining stability under varying loads are discussed.Item Three essays on Registered Investment Advisors in the United States(2011-08) Dean, Luke; Finke, Michael S.; Akay, Ozzy; Salter, John; Reifman, Alan; Harness, NathanThe study of Investment Advisors is important to practitioners, government legislators, regulators, and household consumers. This three essay dissertation examines Registered Investment Advisors in the United States. The first essay examines the association between type of compensation and type of clientele. The second essay examines what type of clients hire RIA firms with more agency costs. The third essay explores the shifts in assets under management and clients in the 2 years after the economic downturn in 2008. This dissertation adds to our understanding of Registered Investment Advisors in the United States and provides insights about the type of clients associated with various types of RIA firms. This study supports the notion that RIA firms charging commissions are more likely to work with lower net worth clients, and have more employees. RIA firms charging commissions are also more likely to provide financial planning services to their clients. In light of recent regulatory reforms in the United Kingdom, Australia, Holland, and other nations considering eliminating commissions in financial services it should be noted that doing so needs to be complemented with efforts to increase the availability of financial planning services to lower net worth clients. Perhaps this is done by increasing the number of professionals offering financial advice (without sacrificing competency standards), or by providing incentives to either professionals or lower net worth clients to seek professional advice. This study finds that lower net worth consumers are more likely to hire investment advisory firms with agency costs like previous ethical violations, dual registration as a broker-dealer, or opaque forms of compensation. This study finds the opposite association between high net worth clients and firms with agency costs, suggesting that lower net worth clients either need to increase their monitoring or become more aware of the variance in quality and costs associated with selecting one investment advisor over another. This study further finds that in the two years after the economic downturn of 2008, that clients did appear to pay closer attention to their investment advisors and any potential conflicts of interest. From July 2008 to July 2010, clients appear to have shifted their assets and accounts towards RIA firms charging fees (AUM fees, fixed fees, hourly fees, and other fees) and clients appeared to shift assets away from firms with agency costs and opaque forms of compensation. The findings of these studies should assist practitioners, regulators, legislators, and consumers as they examine the association between certain forms of compensation and types of clients. Consistent with the literature, it appears that less informed consumers need to be protected from themselves as much as they need to be protected from potential conflicts of interest. Consumers appear to have an implicit trust that anyone holding themselves out to be a professional investment advisor is competent, ethical, and has their best interests at heart when they make recommendations. Regulatory authorities in various countries are making efforts to elevate or regain that trust amongst consumers.Item Two essays on managerial risk-seeking activities and compensation contracts(2014-08) Kang, Chang Mo; Almazan, AndresThis dissertation examines how the structures of compensation for executives and directors are affected by the possibility that managers can influence the risk of a firm's cash flows. In chapter 1, I consider a moral hazard model which shows that a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity in managerial compensation may deteriorate shareholder value when shareholders cannot monitor managerial risk-seeking activities. Intuitively, while high-powered managerial compensation provides the manager with incentives to increase the firm's value by exerting effort, it also creates managerial incentive to engage in (unproductive) risk-seeking activities. To test this prediction, I consider a regulatory change that makes it more difficult for managers to conceal information about the (speculative) use of derivative instruments. Specifically, I examine how the structures of compensation for executives and managers are affected by the adoption of a new accounting standard, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FAS 133) which mandates the fair value accounting for derivative holdings. Consistent with the model prediction, I find that relative to other firms, derivative users (firms that traded derivatives before adopting FAS 133) increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO/CFO compensation. In Chapter 2, I extend the model by incorporating the realistic features that shareholders delegate to the (self-interested) board the tasks of monitoring managers and of setting their compensation contracts. My analysis shows that while high-powered board compensation induces the board to monitor the firm and to properly design managerial compensation, it also provides the board with incentives to misreport managerial risk-seeking activities and to engage in collusive behavior with the manager at the expense of shareholders. From these trade-offs, I develop a number of testable hypotheses and take them to the data. Consistent with the model predictions, I find that firms in which (i) managerial risk-seeking activities are more likely to occur (e.g., high R&D firms or banks) and (ii) board monitoring costs are likely to be lower (e.g., firms that have non-officer blockholders on the board) show weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity of board compensation and stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.