Browsing by Subject "Campaigns"
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Item Campaign clientelism in Peru : an informational theory(2013-05) Munoz Chirinos, Paula; Madrid, Raúl L.; Weyland, Kurt Gerhard; Madrid, Raúl L.; Weyland, Kurt GerhardWhile clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives and angles, scholars typically emphasize the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. However, electoral clientelism continues to be widespread in many countries despite the absence of organized parties or electoral machines. In order to account for this puzzle, I propose an informational approach that stresses the indirect effects that investments in electoral clientelism have on vote intentions. By distributing minor consumer goods, politicians buy the participation of poor voters at rallies and different sorts of campaign events. I argue that this particular subtype of electoral clientelism -- "campaign clientelism" -- helps politicians improvise political organizations, influence indifferent clients, and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors. Thus, by influencing competition and the dynamics of the race, campaign clientelism shapes vote choices and electoral outcomes. Campaign clientelism affects vote choices through two causal mechanisms. First, this subtype of electoral clientelism can help establish candidates' electoral viability, especially where alternative signals provided by well-organized parties are weak. By turning out large numbers of people at rallies, candidates establish and demonstrate their electoral prospects to the media, donors, rent-seeking activists, and voters. In this way, politicians induce more and more voters to support them strategically. Second, campaign clientelism can convince unattached rally participants of the candidates' electoral desirability. While providing different sorts of information at campaign events, politicians help campaign clients make choices. Other things being equal, viable and desirable candidates have better chances of actually achieving office. Qualitative, quantitative, and experimental evidence from Peru, a democracy without parties, supports the informational theory's expectations.Item Careful crackdowns : human rights and campaigning on public security in Latin America(2012-05) Uang, Randy Sunwin; Hunter, Wendy; Weyland, Kurt; Dietz, Henry; Madrid, Raul; Greene, KennethCrime and violence are regularly seen as being ripe for politicians to turn into campaign issues and win votes. This study argues, in contrast, that success on public security is not so automatic: human rights values constrain the use of security and the winning of votes on it. Even in Latin American countries, where voters' concerns about rampant crime and violence are among the highest in the world, considerations of human rights combine with low trust in security forces to restrict the viability of the issue in key ways. Examination of presidential campaigns in Colombia in 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010 supports this claim. Success on security is a two-step process: invoking the issue and then gaining voter support on the topic. Usability depends on the absence of recent repression and the degree of organization of security threats. Then, winning votes on it depends on having a civilian background, a campaign that balances security with other issues, and messages of careful enforcement. These messages of careful enforcement promise targeted, deliberate use of security forces' enforcement activities in a way that pays attention to human rights, rather than promising unbridled enforcement, increased punishment, or programs of long-term prevention. This study therefore shows how candidates are forced to walk a fine line between promising to establish order and promising to protect basic rights and liberties. These findings are powerful, providing an understanding of public security in electoral campaigns that maintains a much closer fit with empirical reality than existing research. The results also provide a critique of the sociological school of vote choice and points to ways in which ownership of the issue of security may be leased away. Furthermore, because the results are driven by the spread of human rights values, the results demonstrate the importance of quick shifts in political culture as a factor that explains changes in political patterns.Item Elite signaling and efficient markets : the evaluation of endorsements in presidential primaries(2016-08) Rao, Nitya Tangada; Roberts, Brian e.; Lin, Tse-MinEndorsements are an integral part of American political campaigns, but despite their ubiquity, there exists only sparse literature evaluating either the impact of endorsements on electoral outcomes or the circumstances in which endorsements are offered. I hypothesized that the primary factor influencing a politician’s decision to endorse was a perceived increase in a candidate’s chance of success; thus politicians are more likely to endorse candidates who have demonstrated a real potential for winning the election. Using the 2012 Republican Presidential nomination and the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination as case studies, I regressed daily proportions of endorsements given on prediction market share prices from the Iowa Electronic Markets. I used an Almon distributed lag model to account for the delay between a politician observing an increase in a candidate’s chance of success and their subsequent endorsement. Though there was a weakly positive association between prediction market share prices and endorsements shares, I found little evidence to support the claim that politicians systematically offer endorsements in response to increases in a candidate’s probability of success.Item Essays on political competition(2013-05) Roeder, Oliver Kelly; Wiseman, Thomas E., 1974-The three branches of American government---judicial, legislative, and executive---serve important governmental roles, and present their own interesting political questions. We answer three here. First, what are the differences between judges and politicians, and how does this inform the formers' selection? Second, how do senators behave to satisfy their political preferences and the electorate's? Third, what is the optimal strategy for a candidate in the Electoral College? American states select judges in various ways. In Chapter 1, we analyze "merit selection." Typically, a nonpartisan commission culls applicants for judgeships, and an appointee is selected by the governor. Then, periodically, this judge undergoes a retention election: an up-or-down vote by the state's electorate. We contribute a microeconomic model to analyze these elections. We compare this institution, in welfare terms, to others used to appoint and retain judges. Finally, we analyze a recent and ongoing phenomenon: these elections are transforming from historically rubber stamp formalities into contested, politicized contests. The politicization of issues brought before courts increases the likelihood of judges being ousted. In Chapter 2, we explore the behavior of legislators in the U.S. Senate, and of the voters who elect them. We examine shifts in incumbent senators' espoused political positions over time, as the reelection campaign approaches. We introduce novel game theoretic models of incumbent-challenger interaction. We find, through empirical analysis of senators' roll call votes, that senators moderate their positions over time, as potential reelection approaches. Moreover, this moderation accelerates. This is explained by the behavior of voters: the moderation is mirrored by the attention paid by voters. Also, the identity of an incumbent's challenger plays an important role in the amount of moderation exhibited by the incumbent. In Chapter 3, we consider a highly adaptable game theoretic model of competition in the Electoral College. It takes the form of a repeated game. Candidates make allocation decisions to persuade voters. Candidates get utility from winning office, and disutility from expending resources. We characterize optimal campaign strategy, and present comparative statics. We show, inter alia, that a candidate with an inherent advantage may prefer a longer campaign.Item Self-financed candidates and how voters perceive them(2012-05) Endres, Kyle Leon; Roberts, Brian E.; Shaw, DaronThe increasing number of candidates relying on their personal wealth and corporate experience in their bids for elected office raises the question: how do voters perceive these non-traditional candidates and their willingness to spend their personal money in order to win elected office? Using both an experimental design and data from the 2009-2010 election cycles, I test for the effects of self-financing one’s political campaign on voter support for the candidates and their vote share in the general election, respectively. I find that partisans’ evaluations of candidates decrease when alerted to their self-financing. Independents evaluate self-financing candidates more positively than traditional candidates. In addition, self-financing one’s campaign had a negative effect on candidates in the 2010 general elections for the U.S. House of Representatives independent of their spending levels.