Browsing by Subject "Bargaining"
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Item Bargaining and fighting in the moonlight(2011-08) Cohen, Matthew Leonard; Lin, Tse-min; Wagner, R. Harrison (Robert Harrison); Trubowitz, Peter; McDonald, Patrick; Granato, James"Audience costs" models of international relations suggest a purely informational role for domestic politics in conflict settings. Here, domestic politics serve as a rich signal of belligerents' true intentions, allowing them to more quickly resolve disagreements, decreasing the likelihood and duration of war. But if belligerents can have different beliefs about publicly available information, then domestic politics might confuse rather than clarify conflict situations, increasing the likelihood and duration of war. I present empirical evidence of conventional "audience costs" models' shortcomings in explaining the dynamics of the US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and the response of Iraqi insurgents to those efforts. I then develop a formal model to show how differences in beliefs between insurgents and counterinsurgents about domestic political audiences in Iraq may have contributed to the prolonged nature of the conflict. I argue that the underlying cause of the conflict's duration is disagreement between belligerents about whether and how Iraqi civilians contribute to a successful counterinsurgency, leading belligerents to disagree not only before fighting about who is likely to win, but during fighting about who is actually winning.Item The domestic consequences of hierarchy in international relations(2012-05) McCormack, Daniel Mark; McDonald, Patrick J., 1973-; Chapman, Terrence L.Recent explorations of hierarchy in international relations have restricted their domain of inquiry to states as aggregate units. Although this has greatly enhanced our understanding of international politics, we know less about what the implications of hierarchy are for domestic politics in subordinate states. Because of the varieties of domestic political control - including violence - employed by great powers, opening up the black box of subordinate state politics can yield new insights into the operations and limits of international hierarchy. Here I outline a theory of political incentivization and link it to a discussion of foreign-imposed regime change, arguing that great powers stabilize politics in subordinate states directly by bolstering preferred regimes and indirectly by threatening to intervene and remove leaders who challenge the status quo.Item Health care and corporate finance(2015-12) Towner, Mitch Scott; Starks, Laura T.; Cohn, Jonathan B.; Fracassi, Cesare; Alti, Aydogan; McInnis, JohnThis dissertation examines issues in U.S. healthcare and capital structure. In the first chapter I give a brief summary of the institutional details of the U.S. healthcare sector with a special emphasis on healthcare finance. In addition to its large size, U.S. healthcare has four unique features that can be used to help answer corporate finance questions: segmented markets, variation in corporate type, extensive data requirements and recent consolidation. I explain how changes over the last 100 years have led to each of these features. Next, I delve deeper into bargaining between insurance companies and hospitals, Medicare pricing, and hospital capital structure decisions during my sample period, 2008-2012. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion on how the Affordable Care Act has contributed to these factors. In the second chapter I use the health care industry as a novel laboratory in which to study a firm's strategic use of debt to enhance their bargaining power during negotiations with non-financial stakeholders. I show that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific procedure are higher when the hospital has more debt. I also show that this effect is stronger when hospitals have less bargaining power relative to insurers ex ante, and that hospitals take on more debt when they have less bargaining power using six proxies including differences in state Medicare laws to further strengthen identification. This is the first paper to provide direct evidence that debt improves a firm's bargaining outcomes.Item Negotiating with terrorists in the shadow of American power(2015-05) Rondou, Benjamin Robert; Wolford, Scott; McDonald, PatrickNegotiation with terrorists is a controversial policy issue that effects both domestic actors and the international community. Current literature only focuses on the domestic characteristics of this phenomenon though. This paper presents a theory of international pressure's influence on the domestic bargaining process between governments and terrorist groups, arguing that governments are more likely to align their domestic terrorism policy with the United States in the aftermath of a terror attack on the US. I find statistical support for this theory using data on concessions to terrorists in Africa from 1989-2010 as concessions are significantly less likely in in the 6 months following an attack on the US