Browsing by Author "McCormack, Daniel Mark"
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Item The domestic consequences of hierarchy in international relations(2012-05) McCormack, Daniel Mark; McDonald, Patrick J., 1973-; Chapman, Terrence L.Recent explorations of hierarchy in international relations have restricted their domain of inquiry to states as aggregate units. Although this has greatly enhanced our understanding of international politics, we know less about what the implications of hierarchy are for domestic politics in subordinate states. Because of the varieties of domestic political control - including violence - employed by great powers, opening up the black box of subordinate state politics can yield new insights into the operations and limits of international hierarchy. Here I outline a theory of political incentivization and link it to a discussion of foreign-imposed regime change, arguing that great powers stabilize politics in subordinate states directly by bolstering preferred regimes and indirectly by threatening to intervene and remove leaders who challenge the status quo.Item Protection from themselves : the domestic consequences of international hierarchy(2015-05) McCormack, Daniel Mark; McDonald, Patrick J., 1973-; Chapman, Terrence; Findley, Michael; Lawrence, Mark; Wolford, MichaelIn recent years, international relations scholarship has begun to take seriously the role that hierarchy plays in shaping international order. The conclusion of this research program is that hierarchical ordering principles primarily work to structure relations among states in the international system. This dissertation offers an alternative view of international hierarchy. More specifically, this project explores the implications that international hierarchy has for political developments within -- rather than between -- states. I first argue that international hierarchy is oriented around the securing of favorable leadership within other states. I find that "dominant states" can alter the willingness of groups within "subordinate states" to compete for domestic political power by shaping the value these groups place on holding office. This argument has three empirical implications. First, I show that by conditionally promising resources like foreign aid to groups within subordinate states, dominant states can bring new, friendly leaders to power, in effect "purchasing" regime change. Second, I find that dominant states are able to deter challenges to their preferred regimes within subordinate states by providing foreign aid and by threatening unfriendly groups with coercion. Finally, I show that the disappearance of hierarchy -- and its attendant regime security -- generate incentives for civil conflict.