Budziszewski, J.2010-11-052010-11-052017-05-112010-11-052010-11-052017-05-112010-05May 2010http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-1469textIn deliberating on the application of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Constitution’s First Amendment, the Supreme Court since 1947 has consistently failed to develop a principled distinction between religion and non-religion. This has hampered its ability to respond to developing challenges in Religion Clauses jurisprudence and to interpret those clauses in a systematic manner. Its recourse to facile characterizations of secularism and pluralism has exacerbated this problem. Attending to incoherence in the Court’s understanding of religion points to a definition of religion based in revelation and grounded not in the language of preference, identity or value, but in natural law and metaphysics.application/pdfengNatural lawReligion clausesEstablishment clauseFree exercise clauseSecularismSecularthesis2010-11-05