Pham, Van Hoang.Abbott, Patricia A. (Patricia Anne), 1987-Baylor University. Dept. of Economics.2010-10-082017-04-072010-10-082017-04-072010-082010-10-08http://hdl.handle.net/2104/8015Includes bibliographical references (p. ).This paper examines the motives for policymakers in their use of antidumping tariffs. In a scenario where a country is facing domestic political economy influences and foreign political economy influences, I find evidence that countries are not in a repeated "prisoner's dilemma" game, but they are in a game of "chicken." In the repeated tariff-setting game, countries take turns in setting antidumping tariffs to appease domestic producers and minimize injury to relationships with important trading partners. I also find that, when examining the US antidumping tariff decisions specifically, the International Trade Association sets tariffs significantly lower against the most important trading partners, a result shown through OLS and instrumental variables regressions.60398 bytes472939 bytesapplication/pdfapplication/pdfen-USBaylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.World Trade Organization.Antidumping.Political economy.Trade.Tariffs.Cooperation.ThesisWorldwide access