Dougherty, Trent.2016-09-012017-04-072016-09-012017-04-072016-082016-07-29August 201http://hdl.handle.net/2104/9833In this dissertation, I investigate our practices of blaming others for failing to believe as they ought to believe. I begin by articulating an account of blame in general, and extend that account to specifically epistemic blame. After considering the relationship between epistemic blame and moral blame, I argue that it is very difficult for us to know whether others are epistemically blameworthy. I conclude by arguing that we have good reasons to expect genuine epistemic blameworthiness to be quite rare, and that this fact justifies a charitable reluctance to blame others epistemically.application/pdfenEpistemic normativity. Blame.Thesis2016-09-01Worldwide access.