Sainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark)2011-06-132011-06-132017-05-112011-06-132011-06-132017-05-112010-12December 2http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-12-2367textIt is widely agreed that ontological reduction is possible, that the ontology of one theory can be shown to be nothing over and above the ontology of a distinct theory. However, it is also widely agreed that one assesses a theory’s ontology by determining what it says there is. I show that there is a tension between these orthodox positions. To resolve this tension, I propose and defend the view that the ontological commitments of a statement are sensitive to the theory in which it is embedded.application/pdfengMetaphysicsOntologyOntological commitmentReductionismMeta-ontologythesis2011-06-13